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INTRODUCTION
A. Background
There is a large interest in carbon capture and storage (CCS) as
an alternative to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. It involves the
capture and permanent storage of CO2. Specifically for countries where
further mitigation of greenhouse gases may be very costly, CCS is consid-
ered as an attractive alternative policy option.1 To some extent it is held
by some that CCS may be unavoidable, especially for those countries that
still largely rely on fossil fuels for their energy supply.2 There is an increas-
ing interest among policy makers in CCS. However, questions arise con-
cerning a regulatory framework that should accompany CCS.3
Some legal systems have now enacted regulations to stimulate the
development of CCS. In the United States there are no rules at the fed-
eral level, but several states have developed CCS regulations4 and on
1 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide,
58 EMORY L. J. 103, 11314 (2008) (qualifying carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)
as a promising technology).
2 See David Hawkins, George Peridas & John Steelman, Twelve Years after Sleipner:
Moving CCS from Hype to Pipe, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4403, 4403 (2009).
3 The International Energy Agency has already provided a model regulatory framework
in November 2010. See INTL ENERGY AGENCY, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: MODEL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 910 (Nov. 2010).
4 For an overview, see Arnold W. Reitze Jr. & Marie Bradshaw-Durant, Control of
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April 2, 2009, Europe promulgated Directive 2009/31 dealing with the
geological storage of carbon dioxide.5 Article 19 of this Directive holds
that Member States shall ensure that proof that adequate provisions
can be established, by way of financial security is presented by the po-
tential operator as part of the application for a storage permit.6 Article
20 also provides that Member States shall ensure that the operator makes
a financial contribution available to the competent authority before the
transfer of responsibility has taken place.7 However, the details of these
liability and compensation mechanisms remain largely unclear.
There are several reasons to focus on the potential liability and
compensation issues related to CO2 storage. A first problem is that CCS
could create so-called long-term risks. This entails that there could be
negative effects and potential damage resulting from CO2 in a distant
future.8 This long-term character always creates problems from a liabil-
ity and compensation perspective. This raises inter alia the question how
financing can be made available when damage would occur at the time
when operators may no longer be in business. A related issue is that the
risks emerging from CCS are not only potentially long-term, but also un-
certain.9 This uncertainty can relate to the probability of damage, but also
to the potential magnitude of the damage when CO2 would accidentally
be released in the atmosphere. These uncertainties make an ex ante predic-
tion of CCS-related risks difficult and that in turn endangers insurability.
B. Goal
It seems important to tackle these issues with an appropriate
legal framework since the absence of such a framework dealing with
liability for damages may jeopardize the development of this potentially
important technology. Such a framework should both provide appropriate
liability rules and allow for compensation of related damages. The goal
of a liability and compensation scheme is to address how the long-term
liability and compensation issues can be solved, and to indicate what
Geological Carbon Sequestration in the Western United States, 14 ENVTL. L. REP., NEWS
& ANALYSIS 10455, 10455 (2011).
5 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114, 119.
6 Id. at 126.
7 Id.
8 JAAP SPIER,SHAPING THE LAW FOR GLOBAL CRISES:THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ROLE THE LAW
COULD PLAY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE MAJOR CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME 24 (Elbert de
Jong ed., 2012) (This leaves untouched the most unfortunate given that, if something
goes wrong, quite a few people may be affected (they may even lose their lives).).
9 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 11819.
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policymakers can do to stimulate market development. The goal of this
Article is therefore to sketch how liability rules could be developed, and
to present a compensation mechanism that takes into account the partic-
ular difficulties arising with CCS, especially the long-tail character of the
potential damage.10
C. Methodology
This Article follows the economic analysis of law as the methodol-
ogy for analyzing appropriate liability and compensation mechanisms
with respect to damages resulting from CO2 storage sites. There are
various reasons for employing this approach. One reason is that many
have already discussed the design of a liability and compensation scheme
for CCS-related damages.11 But these earlier studies have not yet ap-
proached the issue from the angle of an economic analysis of law. The
advantage of this methodology is that attention is paid to the way in which
various liability and compensation schemes affect the incentives for
prevention of the various stakeholders involved.12 After all, an important
feature of any liability and compensation scheme should be that itprovides
appropriate incentives for prevention in the first place. Moreover, the law
and economics methodology allows for both an assessment of liability
rules from an efficiency perspective and an analysis of how the shape of
particular liability rules can stimulate their insurability.
D. Structure
The structure of this Article will be as follows: first the nature of
the risks posed by CCS and the relevant stakeholders will be sketched out
(II). This is obviously necessary to have some idea as to whether there
are potential long-term liabilities involved, the degree of uncertainty, and
the potential magnitude of the damage. Next, this Article will address the
question of what goals liability rules could fulfill in a CCS system, what
parties could be held liable and how liability rules could be efficiently
10 This refers to the fact that CCS can lead to long-lasting damage that may appear years
after the initial CO2 storage. Damage in that sense can have a long-tail.
11 SeeDavidE.Adelman & Ian J. Duncan, The Limits of Liability in PromotingSafe Geologic
Sequestration of CO2, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 1, 67 (2011); Klass & Wilson, supra
note 1, at 108.
12 See generally Michael G. Faure, Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability, in
THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 12987 (F. Cafaggi, F. Watt & H.
Muir eds., 2011) (summarizing the literature on the economic analysis of liability rules).
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structured (particularly the choice between strict liability and negli-
gence) (II). We then turn logically to the options available to policymakers
with respect to liability rules. This Article will show that policymakers are
basically confronted with the dilemma of balancing a broad scope of
liability (adding to the preventive effect of liability rules and stimulating
the compensatory function of liability) against the danger that this may
endanger the insurability of liability. Hence, particular features and
limits of liability rules (such as available defences, applicability of liabil-
ity rules in time and causation rules) need to be discussed since they can
have an important bearing on the scope of liability (III).
Then we turn to compensation by first discussing general princi-
ples of fair and efficient compensation (IV). Next, this Article turns to
criteria for insurability (V), such as the predictability of the risk, and the
capacity and the need to remedy traditional problems such as moral
hazard and adverse selection. Of course, the question that will have to
be addressed is the extent to which these issues play an important role
in cases of CCS. In addition to traditional insurance, alternative compen-
sation mechanisms also need to be discussed (VI). Accordingly, attention
will be paid inter alia to guarantees and deposits as well as the option of
a risk-sharing agreement (pooling by operators). This study of insurance
(V) and its alternatives (VI) merits the question of what role government
(and policymakers in general) could play in facilitating compensation,
particularly the insurability of CCS liability (VII).
This Article will end with a summary and formulation of policy rec-
ommendations (VIII). These will largely focus on the question of what
policymakers can do to stimulate solutions for long-term liability issues re-
lated to CCS, combining the goal of preventing harm and making effective
compensation available. This will be followed by concluding observations.
I. NATURE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN CCS
A. What Is CCS?
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) was developed as an alterna-
tive to reducing greenhouse gases via changes in technology thatwouldmit-
igate the emission of greenhouse gases.13 CCS amounts to a technology
whereby CO2 is captured, transported and subsequently stored for a long
period of time.14 The principle is that CO2 is captured from power plants
13 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 107.
14 Id.
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since these are (especially when it is from coal-fired power plants) large
emitters of greenhouse gases, or from other industrial sources.15 After
being captured, the CO2 is transported to a sequestration site where it is
injected at great depths underground;16 storage usually takes place in
geological formations such as depleted oil and gas reservoirs or unminable
coal seams.17 As injection can occur both onshore and offshore,18 the cost
of CCS depends on the cost of capturing, transporting, and storing the
CO2.19 Finally, after storage, monitoring has to take place to conclude the
full chain of CCS.20 In principle, the CO2 should remain in the under-
ground storage site forever21 and, as will be discussed, experts maintain
that so long as sites are appropriately selected, the risks of CO2 leakage
diminish over time, and are considered small.22 The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that for well-selected sites,
over 99% of the injected CO2 will very likely (this refers to a probability
of 90 to 99%) remain underground for over 100 years.23
The IPCC quote referenced in the previous footnote shows two
features of CCS that are crucial to the assessment of long-term liability
risks: (1) properly stored CCS can provide an important contribution to
the reduction of CO2 emissions; and (2) these positive effects depend upon
the selection, design, and management of the geological storage sites. In
this respect, the risks of CCS are strongly related to appropriate site
selection and monitoring of the storage conditions, which may require
regulatory oversight.24 Moreover, the most attractive sites (in terms of
15 Id.
16 Id. at 115.
17 Id.
18 SVEN BODE & MARTINA JUNG, HAMBURGISCHES WELT-WIRTSCHAFTS-ARCHIV HAMBURG
INST. OF INTL ECON., CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGELIABILITY FOR NON-
PERMANENCE UNDER THE UNFCCC 3 (July 14, 2005).
19 Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 3.
21 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 107.
22 See infra Part I.D.2.
23 See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBONDIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 14 (Bert Metz et
al. eds. 2005), available at http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/special-reports/.files-images/SRCCS
-WholeReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/NHR4-9J2M] (Observations from engineered and
natural analogues as well as models suggest that the fraction retained in appropriately
selected and managed geological reservoirs is very likely to exceed 99% over 100 years
and is likely to exceed 99% over 1,000 years. For well-selected, designed and managed
geological storage sites, the vaste majority of the CO2 will gradually be immobilised by
various trappingmechanisms and, in that case, could be retained for up to millions of years.
Because of these mechanisms, storage could become more secure over longer timeframes).
24 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 107.
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geological conditions) are likely to be occupied by so-called first movers.25
Hence, the potential for damages may increase when the technology is
implemented on a larger scale and storage takes place at riskier seques-
tration sites.
Enthusiasm for CCS is typically seen in countries that continue
to use coal as a main energy source and think CCS could be used to create
clean coal.26 This explains the interest for CCS in countries like the
United States and Canada, but given large energy demands it may be a
possibility for China and India as well.27 Both the United States and
Canada consider CCS to be a key technology in climate change policy.28
B. Advantages
The obvious advantage for countries like the United States and
Canada is that CCS would, to a large extent, allow business as usual as
far as energy policy is concerned.29 In other words, these countries could
continue their reliance on coal as their primary energy source and miti-
gate its negative consequences by capturing the CO2 that results from
coal-fired power plants and storing it via CCS technology.30 The advan-
tages of CCS are therefore especially apparent to those who consider CCS
to be a mitigation technology for clean coal.31 It has also mentioned in legal
literature as a promising technology that could enable the continued use
of inexpensive fossil fuels while dramatically reducing accompanying
greenhouse gas emissions,32 notwithstanding the potential risks.33 CCS
25 See id. at 171.
26 See Chiara Trabucchi & Lindene Patton, Storing Carbon: Options for Liability Risk
Management, Financial Responsibility, WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, THE BUREAU
OF NATL AFFAIRS 5 (2008) (arguing that the adoption of CCS technology is critical to the
economic future of states that mine coal and depend heavily upon electricity from coal-
fired powered [plants]. Given large coal reserves, they argue that countries like the United
States will also in the future largely rely on coal as energy source (coal today providing
approximately 50% of the electric supply in the United States).
27 Id.
28 See ZENMAKUCH,SLAVINA GEORGIEVA &BEHDEENORAEE-MIRZAMANI,CARBONCAPTURE
AND STORAGE: REGULATING LONG TERM LIABILITY 16 (Makuch & Pereira eds., 2011).
29 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26.
30 These advantages constitute the reason why environmental non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) like Greenpeace are very critical of CCS and argue that it is more of a
smoke screen than a sustainable solution. See GREENPEACE, FALSE HOPEWHY CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE WONT SAVE THE CLIMATE 37 (2008).
31 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 46.
32 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 107.
33 See infra Part II.E.
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is hence promoted by a broad range of stakeholders who assert that
avoiding climate change will be impossible without it.34 That is the
opinion of the International Energy Agency (IEA), which argued that
without CCS the annual costs of cutting global CO2 emissions in half by
2050 would increase by 71% ($1.28 trillion per year).35 Their conclusion
is that CCS is therefore essential to the achievement of deep emission
cuts.36 Also, prominent scholars have argued inter alia that states
should act with fierce urgency to develop and implement CCS.37 Scholars
therefore generally conclude that CCS holds great promise as an ap-
proach for preventing CO2 emissions from entering the atmosphere38 but
at the same time warn that its success depends on the ability of a site to
safely confine CO2 in injection reservoirs, preventing it from migrating to
the surface and causing harm or injury to public health or ecosystems.39
C. Barriers and Limits
Despite the potential advantages of CCS and the enthusiasm it
has generated from leading scholars (and some policymakers),40 CCS
projects have seen very limited development so far. A 2008 article re-
ferred to four pilot projects that would soon be underway.41 But until
recently there were no commercialized CCS projects anywhere in the
world.42 A March 2013 communication from the European Commission
on the future of carbon capture and storage in Europe mentioned that at
that moment twenty demonstration-scale projects were in operation.43
34 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 1.
35 INTL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS: CO2 CAPTURE AND
STORAGE: A KEY-CARBON ABATEMENT OPTION 15 (2008), available at https://www.iea.org
/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_2008.pdf [http:/perma.cc/JT9Q-3VN9].
36 Id. at 15.
37 See Steven Chu, Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 325 SCIENCE 1599 (2009).
38 Chiara Trabucchi, Michael Donlan & Sarah Wade, A Multi-Disciplinary Framework
to Monitize Financial Consequences Arising from CCS Projects and Motivate Effective
Financial Responsibility, 4 INTL J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 388, 393 (2010).
39 Id.
40 See infra Part I.
41 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 117.
42 Information provided by experts from the IEA.
43 Eur. Commn, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions
on the Future of Carbon Capture and Storage in Europe, at 14, COM (2013) 180 final
(Mar. 27, 2013) [hereinafter COM (2013) 180 final]. Information provided by Mr. Shaun
McCoy of the IEA in a conversation with the author in March 2013.
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There are also two full-scale projects located in Norway.44 But besides
these projects,45 large scale development of CCS has not taken place.46
This paradox is related to the fact that notwithstanding the apparent
advantages of CCS there are still substantial barriers to its implementa-
tion. These barriers are well summarized in the provocative title of a
study by Hawkins, Peridas, and Steelman: Twelve Years after Sleipner:
Moving CCS from Hype to Pipe.47
According to them, the first important barrier is based on the cur-
rent carbon policies.48 In simple terms: in legal systems such as the United
States,49 where a regulatory regime forcing greenhouse gas emitters to mit-
igate is largely lacking, the economic incentive to develop CCS will clearly
be lackingas well.50 Thispoint is well-developed in a European Commission
communication on the future of carbon capture and storage in Europe,51
where it is argued that the current cost of CCS is in the order of 40 per
ton of CO2 for which emission was avoided. But prices under the Euro-
pean emission trading scheme are well below this price and (depending
44 The reason for the location of two full-scale CCS projects in Norway is that oil and gas
producers in that country face a tax of approximately  25/ton of CO2, which may lead to
commercial development of CCS in Norway. Id. at 1415.
45 An overview of these projects is provided in the European Commission Communication
on the future of carbon capture and storage in Europe. Id. at 2426.
46 See Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 440405.
47 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 117 (referring to an experiment to inject CO2 from
natural gas production in the North Sea); see also Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra
note 2.
48 Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4405.
49 At least at the U.S. federal level, at state level, many initiatives aimed at mitigation
of greenhouse gas emissions do take place. See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regula-
tory Initiatives addressing GHG Leakage in the USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE ANDEUROPEAN
EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 22556 (Michael Faure &
Marjan Peeters eds., 2008).
50 Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4405 (The single biggest barrier standing
in the way of CCS deployment is the absence of comprehensive climate policies that place
a significant market value on avoiding emissions. Without such policies and legislation,
economic drivers for CCS are simply lacking, as there is little other reason to capture and
sequest the carbon). This was also the opinion of Professor Michael Celia, information
provided on February 27, 2013. See also Charles H. Haake & Karyn B. Marsh, The
Trouble with Angels: Carbon Capture and Storage Hurdles and Solutions, WORLD CLIMATE
CHANGE REPORT (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications
/Documents/Haake-Marsh-TroubleWithAngelsCarbonCaptureAndStorage.pdf [http://perma
.cc/JS36-PM24] (holding that the private sectors inaction is likely due to the lack of legal
frameworkdefiningthe relative rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of stakeholders).Note,
however, that they wrote this in 2009; a regulatory frameworkhas meanwhile been provided
in some legal systems such as the United States and EU.
51 COM (2013) 180 final, supra note 43, at 1416.
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upon fluctuations) are closer to 5.52 Under those circumstances, ratio-
nales for economic operators to invest in CCS are largely lacking.53
Hawkins, Peridas, and Steelman also posit that a lacking regula-
tory framework and the potential for long-term liability could reduce
incentives for investments in CCS.54 Others point to the technological
uncertainties with respect to capturing CO2 that still persist. These
opponents argue that it is important to tackle these technological uncer-
tainties (e.g. via public-private partnerships) rather than focus on a
liability cap that would not reduce those uncertainties.55
Many mention the fear of potential liability as an important
barrier, which results in valuable CCS projects not emerging.56 One of
the most important political problems facing CCS (which could constitute
a barrier to its implementation) is the appearance of risk. This has re-
sulted in environmental NGOs like Greenpeace qualifying CCS as risky
business, merely providing false hope.57 Hence, it is important to address
expert opinion concerning the nature of the long-term risk posed by CCS
and the potential damage that could result from it.
D. Potential Risks
1. Nomenclature of Risks
First, it should be stressed that experts agree the risks involved in
CCS projects depend very much on the project cycle (see Part F) of a CCS
project. Too often, attention is paid merely to long-tail risks, despite the
fact that risks can emerge at different stages of the CCS project.58 The
important question from a liability and insurance perspective, however,
is to what extent it is possible to assess the long-term risks of a CCS
project. This is particularly important since liability and insurance are
often better suited for sudden and accidental events than for long-tail
risks. Hence, a lot of the debate focuses on the nature of the potential
long-tail risks related to CCS.59
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4407.
55 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 6365.
56 See infra Part III (focusing on liability rules).
57 GREENPEACE, supra note 30, at 30.
58 Elizabeth Aldrich, Cassandra Koener & David W. Keith, Analysis of Liability Regimes
for Carbon Capture and Sequestration: A Review for Policy Makers, THE ENERGY POLY
INST., Dec. 2011, at 9.
59 See Elisabeth J. Wilson, Timothy L. Johnson & David W. Keith, Regulating the Ultimate
Sink: Managing the Risks of Geologic CO2 Storage, 35 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 3476, 3477 (2003)
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Generally, a distinction is made between risks related to the re-
lease of CO2 in the atmosphere and other types of risks that could lead
to different types of damage during the various phases of the project life
cycle.60 In CCS literature, a further distinction is made between risks of
a global nature (particularly the release of CO2 into the atmosphere) and
risks of a more local nature.61 Schematically, the following risks could be
distinguished.
a. Global CO2 Emissions
The mere leakage of CO2 by itself would be a problem from the
perspective that regulatory climate change goals (as they have been inter
alia laid down in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol) could not be reached.62
Hence, leakage of CO2 could potentially lead to liability for the non-perma-
nence of CCS.63 But while leakage could create a risk of climate change
liability,64 other risks could emerge as well. It is important to assess the
nature of these risks, meaning the probability of their occurrence and the
nature of the damage that could result if they materialized.
b. Affecting Water Aquifers
A second risk mentioned in CCS literature, not related to climate
change liability and resulting from CCS, is that sequestration sites may
have a negative impact on drinking water aquifers.65 This could result
from either CO2 leakage or from the intrusion of native salt-laden waters,
which are referred to as brines.66 The brines could then be driven upward
from sequestration reservoirs through the elevated pressures resulting
from CO2 injection.67 However, the nature of these risks is different; CO2
plumes in sequestration reservoirs can extend several kilometres from
(for an overview of the potential risks coming from CCS); see also Aldrich, Koerner &
Keith, supra note 58, at 45.
60 See, e.g., Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 810.
61 See, e.g., Wilson, Johnson & Keith, supra note 59, at 3477.
62 See Bode & Jung, supra note 18, at 180.
63 Id.
64 SeeADJUDICATINGCLIMATE CHANGE:STATE,NATIONAL ANDINTERNATIONAL APPROACHES
(William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009); CLIMATE CHANGELIABILITY (Michael
Faure & Marjan Peeters eds.,2011); CLIMATE CHANGE REMEDIES INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSES (Jaap Spier & Ulrich Magnus eds., 2014).
65 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 13.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Id.
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a CO2 injection well, but the area of elevated pressure in which brines
could be forced into aquifers can extend across tens of kilometres.68 The
release of CO2 and brine could potentially lead to contamination ofdrinking
water through mobilization of toxic metals and increased salinity.69 In
their article, Adelman and Duncan stress that the risk of CO2 leakage
may to some extent be exaggerated since the risk of brine leakage and
pressure changes is in fact more substantial.70 They substantiate this
claim with empirical data that establish that fifty years after the end of
active CO2 injections, the CO2 plume would extend just three to five
kilometres from the injection well, whereas the elevated pressure would
be projected to extend many tens of kilometres from the well.71
c. Seismic Risks
The risk of brines being displaced within potable aquifers and the
potential contamination of hydrocarbon resources have also been men-
tioned in CCS literature, as has the danger of pressure changes causing
ground heave and possibly triggering seismic events.72 However, Wilson,
Klass and Bergan argue that these risks likely will be small with properly-
managed sites.73
d. Personal Injury
In addition to the impact to water resources and the potential
atmospheric release of CO2, Wilson, Klass and Bergan also mention the
fact that at very high concentrations (greater than 30%) CO2 may cause
immediate human death from asphyxiation.74 An oft-quoted case involved
a rapid CO2 release from an underlining volcanic source from Lake Nyos
in Cameroon, which would have led to the deaths of more than 1,700
people.75 However, the IPCC clearly held that this CO2 release is not
representative of the seepage through wells or fractures that may occur
from underground geological storage sites.76
68 Id. at 5.
69 Id. at 11.
70 Id. at 4.
71 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 15.
72 Elisabeth J. Wilson, Alexandra B. Klass & Sara Bergan, Assessing a Liability Regime
for Carbon Capture and Storage, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4575, 4576 (2009).
73 Id.
74 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 118.
75 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 8.
76 Id. at 8 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT
ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 211 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005)).
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e. Environmental Risks
Finally, it should be mentioned that, in addition to the effects on the
global atmosphere mentioned above, the emission of CO2 can also cause
negative local environmental effects leading, e.g., to the killing of trees.77
2. Risks Limited
It is, however, important to stress that much of the CCS literature
holds that, provided that the location site is correctly selected, the CCS
risk profile is in fact rather limited, especially when the (often feared) long-
tail risks are considered.78 In this respect the earlier quote, oft-repeated
in CCS literature, from the IPCC study showing that the risk of CO2
leakage from a well-managed sequestration site is likely to be small in
magnitude and distant in time79 is important. For sites that are well-
selected, designed, operated, and monitored it is very likely that more than
99% of the stored CO2 will remain sequestered for more than 100 years.80
Significant scientific research has been done concerning the risks associ-
ated with CCS.81 The results show not only that the nature of these risks
remains basically the same during the carbon dioxide injection/operation
and after the closure of the site, but also that the risk of carbon leakage
during the post injection phase is expected to diminish over time.82 One
study holds: The good news is that the likelihood that the risk of some
events occurring that result in an unexpected release of carbon dioxide
more than 10 years after termination of injection will become increasingly
remote due to geochemistry conditions.83 Other studies mention that
CO2 storage has a potentially declining risk profile.84
In summary, CCS literature points to various potential risks, dis-
tinguishing between CO2 releases and other types of risks.85 The likeli-
hood of CO2 releases is considered small and even diminishing over
time,86 but that result is strongly dependent upon proper site selection
77 See Wilson, Johnson & Keith, supra note 59, at 3477.
78 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11.
79 See, e.g., id. at 1819.
80 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 11.
81 See Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 5.
82 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10.
83 Id. at 12.
84 James J.Dooley, Chiara Trabucchi&Lindene Patton,Design Considerations for Financing
a National Trust to Advance the Deployment of Geologic CO2 Storage and Motivate Best
Practices, 4 INTL J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 381, 381 (2009).
85 See IPCC, supra note 23.
86 Id.; see generally Dooley, Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 84.
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and operation monitoring.87 Finally, it should be mentioned that many
studies have indicated that notwithstanding remaining uncertainties, it
is possible to quantify the risks involved in CCS, since estimates can be
made both of the probability of releases as well as the potential damage
that could occur as a result.88 Hence, monetization of the expected losses
can be done in a site-specific manner.
Some scholars stress that there has already been direct evidence
of CO2 sequestration, which would confirm the low probability of the
risk.89 CO2 has been used to facilitate oil extraction, which involves pump-
ing large volumes of CO2 underground.90 The safety record of CO2 in those
cases was excellent.91 Other studies refer to evidence of fluid injection,
which suggests that long-term containment of CO2 can be achieved in
sites that are appropriately chosen, constructed, operated, and monitored.92
E. Potential Damage
The potential damage that could occur in the event potential CCS-
related risks materialize logically follows from the previous discussion.93
It should again be stressed that it is probably more important to focus on
the probability that the risk will emerge, which according to scientific
literature is small,94 than on the potential damage. However, CCS litera-
ture also stresses that given the nature of the damage resulting from the
primary risk of CCS (contamination of drinking water aquifers) it is
unlikely that these costs would be huge.95 Although CCS-related damage
could undoubtedly trigger significant remediation costs, those would bear
little resemblance to the large chemical releases to which Superfund
applies.96 The potential damage that could result from CO2 storage largely
87 Dooley, Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 84, at 381.
88 See Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38.
89 See Ian J. Duncan, Jean-Philippe Nicot & Jong-Won Choi, Assessment for Future CO2 Se-




92 Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 393.
93 See Mark A. De Figueiredo, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage (Ph.D. Thesis,
Massachusettes Institute of Technology) 15491 (2007), available at http://sequestration
.mit.edu/pdf/Mark_de_Figueiredo_PhD_Dissertation.pdf [http://perma.cc/938K-357U] (dis-
cussing the types of damages that could result from CO2 storage).
94 IPCC, supra note 23, at 211; see generally Dooley, Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 84.
95 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 4.
96 Id. Superfund refers to the compensation mechanism for the costs of remediating soil
pollution in the United States.
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corresponds to the previously mentioned risk categories.97 Hence, CCS
literature recognizes the following potential damage categories:
 Atmospheric releases.98 Already mentioned, these
constitute the typical climate liability damages.99
In legal systems that have a carbon cap, an economic
valuation of the releases of CO2 is possible; in other
legal systems this could be more problematic.100
 Impacts on water resources.101 These are the previ-
ously mentioned impacts on drinking water, ground-
water,and/or surface water.102 Again, water markets
are established and provide a proxy for valuing the
damage to water resources.103
 Geological impacts.104 Following seismic events, sub-
stantial damage could obviously affect houses as
well as urban infrastructure.
 Human health impacts (in the rare cases that very
high concentrations of CO2 result in morbidity or
mortality).105 There is extensive experience in valu-
ing these human health impacts, which would make
a loss valuation possible.106
 Ecological impacts.107 These could lead to the type
of natural resource damage that would make com-
pensation for, e.g., replacement costs, necessary.108
In other words, most of the damaging effects of CCS can, accord-
ing to prior studies, be estimated and valuated in monetary terms.109
However, these studies also indicate that (even though the probability is
small) CCS-created pressure changes could potentially cause ground
97 See supra Part I.D.1.
98 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 31.
99 Id. at 21.
100 See generally id.
101 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10.
102 Id. at 11.
103 Id.
104 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4576.
105 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10.
106 Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 390.
107 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10.
108 Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 390.
109 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 910.
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heave and even trigger seismic events.110 If this were the case, the dam-
age could potentially be catastrophic in nature.
F. Project Life Cycle
As was already mentioned, the risks involved in a CCS project to
some extent depend upon the life cycle of the CCS project.111 From the out-
set it should be stated that in this study we strongly focus on the final
phase of CCS, the geological storage of CO2, since that is the most interest-
ing phase from a liability and compensation perspective. However, as will
be made clear, geological storage is only one, albeit essential, part of CCS.
Trabucchi and Patton distinguish between risks in different
phases. First, they distinguish between capture, transport, and sequestra-
tion (storage), and within sequestration they distinguish between siting/
design, operation (CO2 injection), closure and post-closure, and long-term
stewardship.112 Risks can, of course, emerge at the first juncture, i.e., the
point of capture where the CO2 is generated,113 as there could be an
improper capture or leakage at the capture point.114 In the second phase,
the transport stage, risks could also emerge given the corrosive nature of
carbon dioxide, especially when mixed with water.115 However, in the first
two phases the risks are not particularly difficult to handle from a liability
and insurance perspective since those will usually be covered by the
insurance policy of the operator or (in the case of liability) transporter.116
More interesting are the risks in the third phase of CO2 seques-
tration. The first step here is site selection and regulatory review.117 It is
important to stress that all authors agree any long-term risk will, to a
large extent, depend upon proper site selection and design.118 The second
110 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4576 (mentioning that those risks are likely
to be small with properly managed sites).
111 See Wilson, Johnson & Keith, supra note 59.
112 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8; see also Ian Havercroft & Richard Macrory,
LEGAL LIABILITY AND CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
1112 (Oct. 2014), available at http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publi
cations/179798/legal-liability-carbon-capture-storage-comparative-perspective.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R8W4-QFR2].
113 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 9.
116 See Aldrich, Koerner & Keith, supra note 58, at 58 (discussing the different phases
of the CCS project life cycle).
117 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 9; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
118 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 9 (mentioning that this first phase on the
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step is active operation of the site, i.e., CO2 injection.119 This could, up to
the point of closure, take one to thirty years.120 The third step is closure
and post-closure monitoring.121 Different authors mention different time
periods for post-closure monitoring,122 however, the important point from
the industrys perspective is that the third step of post-closure monitor-
ing has a defined time period.123 Only the long-term stewardship, the
final phase, could potentially take hundreds of years124 and is, in other
words, indefinite.125 That is why, especially as far as long-term steward-
ship is concerned, many consider the role of the state and believe that
liability for long-term stewardship should be transferred to it.126 This
model is already incorporated in the EU Directive 2009/31/EC on the
geological storage of carbon dioxide.127 Article 17 of the Directive deals
with the closure and aftercare of the storage site128 and holds that once
a site is deemed closed, liabilities shall pass to the state.129 Of course, the
question arises as to what the time limit would be. According to CCS-
related literature, the time limit before such a passage could be long,
even decades, unless needed legislative certainty is provided.130 The CCS
Directive also spells out the framework requirements to ensure the long-
term stewardship of storage sites.131
The Directive thus provides for the possibility of sites being trans-
ferred to Member State control for the long-term.132 A condition under the
EU CCS Directive for the transfer of liabilities to the state is that a fi-
nancial contribution be made for the post-transfer period covering the costs
for monitoring for at least thirty years. Similar approaches concerning
siting/design decision would normally take less than a year). But see Klass & Wilson,
supra note 1, at 115 (mentioning, however, that this phase could take one to ten years).
119 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
120 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115
(mentioning a period of twenty to thirty years).
121 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
122 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10 (mentioning ten, twenty, or fifty years). But
see Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115 (referring to fifteen to thirty years).
123 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
124 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
125 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8.
126 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 164.
127 Id. at 171.
128 Id. at 174.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 7.
131 Id.
132 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 9.
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transfer of liability for long-term stewardship to the state have been
proposed in other CCS literature.133
Graphically, the CCS project life cycle could be presentedas follows:
TABLE 1. CCS PROJECT LIFE CYCLE134
G. Uncertainties
Although it has been said that the potential risks related to CCS
can be managed, monitored, and valuated,135 some believe there are still
substantial uncertainties related to both legal issues and technological
uncertainties, which could create major barriers to its deployment.136
133 See, e.g., Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26; see also M.A. de Figueiredo, D.M. Reiner
& H.J. Herzog, Framing the Long-Term in situ liability issue for geologic carbon storage
in the United States, 10 MITIGATION &ADAPTION STRATEGIES FOR GLOB.CHANGE 647, 648
(2005); Nathan R. Hoffman, The Feasibility of Applying Strict-Liability Principles to
Carbon Capture and Storage, 49 WASHBURN L. J. 527, 528 (2010).
134 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 115.
135 See supra Part I.D.2.
136 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 6364.
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Uncertainties would exist, especially with respect to capturing CO2,137
however, they should not preclude bounded estimates of risks since a rea-
sonable risk assessment is very much possible.138 Trabucchi and Patton
stress that the nature of uncertainty may be different in the various
phases of the CCS project life cycle.139 Uncertainties are especially high
in the post-closure phase of a CCS project since this may occur ten, twenty,
or fifty years into the future.140 Although the nature of the risks may
largely be the same as during the period of CO2 injection and operation
of the site, what changes in the long-term is the added risk of changing
science.141 Also, societys understanding of what it means to store CO2 in
perpetuity may evolve, which adds uncertainty to the post-closure phase
of a CCS project as compared to the previous phases.142 Finally, in addi-
tion to these technical uncertainties, there may be legal uncertainties
that could just as easily hamper the development of CCS technology.143
H. Summary
This brief introduction to the possibilities and challenges of CCS
shows that there are many potential benefits to CCS projects. Those who
stress the need for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions argue that the
cost of reducing CO2 emissions could be huge, especially for the power
industry as it is very coal-reliant.144 For them, CCS may be a cost-effective
alternative. Opponents point to the potential risks and damage that
could emerge from CCS projects, but technological evidence from inde-
pendent sources seems to indicate that those risks can be reduced to rea-
sonable levels so long as there is appropriate site selection, operation,
and monitoring.145 A particular feature of the risks involved in CCS is
that long-termpost-storage monitoring may be needed,which in some cases
could potentially take hundreds of years and hence extend beyond the
life span of the companies involved in the earlier phases of the project life
137 See id. at 64.
138 Id. at 17.
139 See supra Part II.F.
140 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26.
141 Id.
142 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 910.
143 See Avelien Haan-Kamminga, Martha M. Roggenkamp & Edwin Woerdman, Legal
Uncertanties of Carbon Capture and Storage in the EU: The Netherlands as an Example,
3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 240, 249 (2010) (analyzing those legal uncertainties).
144 See generally Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 113.
145 Id. at 109.
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cycle.146 This explains why applying traditional concepts of liability and
insurance may not be easy for potential damages (which is also highly
uncertain) that could theoretically manifest after fifty years. For that
reason, many call for a governmental role in long-term stewardship.147
Government involvement could be an important incentive for the
development of CCS projects. Indeed, notwithstanding the alleged advan-
tages of CCS projects, it is striking that few projects have yet been de-
veloped on a commercial scalein fact none at all.148 To a large extent
this may be related to technological barriers and uncertainties, but most
importantly it is due to economic factors.149 CCS may, understandably,
only become an economically viable alternative in a legal environment
where there is a legal duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and hence
where carbon is appropriately priced. Moreover, the CCS literature also
indicates that industries may be reluctant to step into the CCS adventure
if it could potentially lead to liability expanding over long time periods.150
This potential long-tail liability is considered even more of a problem in
situations where the economic benefits of CCS are yet uncertain.151 The
remainder of this Article will address the extent to which a liability and
compensation regime can provide an institutional background that ade-
quately balances societal and operator interests, presents incentives for
investment in CCS projects, and reasonably limitspotential financial risks.
II. LIABILITY RULES FOR CCS
Now that we have outlined the nature of CCS and the potential
risks involved during the different phases of the CCS life cycle, it is possible
to address potential liability regimes for CCS, taking into account princi-
ples of the economic analysis of law. This will be done in different steps:
first the general goals of a liability system for CCS will be sketched out.
A crucial question within the economic analysis of accident law is whether
such a liability regime should be based on strict liability or negligence.152
146 Id. at 132.
147 Id. at 159.
148 Id. at 109, 171.
149 Id. at 109.
150 See Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 122.
151 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 10910 (citing examples of other issues affecting the
certainty of the economic benefits of CCS).
152 Id. at 13543.
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Also, many have stressed the limits of liability rules in addressing risks
of an ultrahazardous nature, to which CCS could belong.153 They claim
the primary instrument aimed at the prevention of CCS-induced harm
should be regulation rather than liability.154 That raises the question of
how such a regulatory framework should be shaped and what the added
value of liability rules would be compared to regulation. After the general
principles of applying liability rules to CCS have been established, a few
policy options regarding the shape of liability rules will be discussed in
more detail.
A. Goals of a Liability System for CCS
From an economic perspective, a liability system has an impor-
tant social function in remedying market failures. The market failure at
stake in the case of CCS would be an externality, more particularly a
negative externality.155 Such an externality (also referred to as a negative
external effect) relates to the idea that actors can engage in socially bene-
ficial activities (like reducing greenhouse gas emissions through CCS)
but at the same time create effects that are not taken into account by the
operator (and thus external).156 If such an externality remains external,
it effectively means that an operator (such as in the case of CCS) could
throw the costs of his activity onto others (i.e., onto society) and only reap
the benefits.157 This behavior would constitute a market failure since it
would mean that operators would not have to take into account the social
costs of their activity (like CCS) in their prices.158 The result would be
that prices would not reflect true social costs; as a result, consumers
could have an excessively high demand for a relatively risky product
(since it did not correctly reflect social costs). Moreover, if CCS operators
were not forced to internalize externalities but competitors in other
branches were, the result would be relatively low prices for producers
engaged in CCS. In other words, liability rules play an important role in
curing the market failure caused by externalities.159
153 Id. at 127, 130, 132.
154 Id. at 17879.
155 Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalisation: The Gap between Private Loss and Social
Cost, 17 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 589, 589 (1997).
156 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 2.
157 Gilead, supra note 155, at 589.
158 Id.
159 See infra Part III.D (arguing that there are obviously many other instruments that
could cure externalities other than liability rules, e.g., ex ante regulation by government,
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At the end of the last century there were fierce debates between
economists and lawyers on the goals of tort law, and some attempts were
made to reconcile the legal (corrective justice-based) approach with the
economic (deterrence) based approach.160 Now the legal community and
policymakers have become more and more convinced of the importance
of liability rules as an instrument of prevention, especially in the envi-
ronmental arena.161 One of the reasons for this change is the increasing
empirical evidence showing that industrial operators (like those in the
environmental field) respond to financial incentives provided through
liability regimes.162
Before addressing whether this efficient level of care can be found
through a strict liability or negligence rule, we will discusshowthe function
of liability rules is viewed in CCS literature.
In a study, Adelman and Duncan mention thatcommon law liability
is likely to play a modest role in promoting safe sequestration of CO2.163
The reason they argue this is that, as was previously mentioned,164 CCS
creates a potential mix of short-term and long-term risks that are diffi-
cult to handle in a liability regime. They refer to articles whose authors
are strongly opposed to transferring long-term stewardship to the gov-
ernment since this would essentially remove liability from operators.
This could present a risk of moral hazard (e.g., location choice) if operators
knew that the government would pay the costs of long-term liability.165
The moral hazard risk is stressed inter alia by Trabucchi and Patton,
who state that if the operator has little or no financial risk this could
lead to poor site selection and management decisions.166 They are there-
fore opposed to financial solutions where the risk would be transferred
and market-based instruments such as emission trading, which has become popular as
an instrument to mitigate climate change).
160 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997).
161 The preventive effect of liability rules was explicitly mentioned in the EU White Paper
on Environmental Liability, which preceded the European Environmental Liability
Directive. See Eur. Commn, White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66
final (Feb. 9, 2000).
162 See generally Empirics of Tort, in TORTLAW AND ECONOMICS 45398 (Michael Faure ed.,
2010); Michael G. Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence
Tell Us?, 36 WM.&MARYENVTL.L.&POLY REV. 293, 30105 (2012) (stating an overview of
empirical evidence with respect to the deterrent effect of liability rules).
163 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 5.
164 See supra Parts I.DF.
165 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 22.
166 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 9.
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to the public since this would remove incentives for proper site selection.167
Trabucchi and Patton instead rely on the deterrent effect of exposure to
liability, arguing that when CCS operators bear the costs of safely oper-
ating and closing their facilities the companies will have a financial in-
centive to site, design, and operate facilities in a risk-reducing manner.168
The literature hence provides a mixed picture on the role of lia-
bility rules for CCS. This may have to do with the fact that liability for
risks emerging in the different phases of the CCS life cycle are some-
times insufficiently distinguished.169 Generally authors seem to agree
that as far as proper site selection, injection, operation, and closure of the
site are concerned, liability rules can play an important role in providing
incentives.170 However, many argue that the role of tort liability is much
more limited with regard to long-term stewardship (long-tail risk).171
Expectations seem to be overstated for the role that the liability system
can play both with the operators and with the public at large. As has
already been mentioned,172 many consider the creation of a proper and
clear liability regime important for providing certainty to the industry.
Concerns about potential liability would hence be an important barrier
to developing CCS projects.173
According to some, there is a demand for a clear liability regime
not only from the industry but also from the public at large.174 Wilson,
Klass and Bergan stress that a clear and transparent liability regime
may help the public have confidence that risks will be actively managed
and, in the event of an accident, effectively remediated and compen-
sated.175 The way in which long-term liability is addressed may therefore
have an impact on public perceptions of CCS.176 This shows that the de-
mand for a liability regime is not based solely on objective valuations of
the risk but may also have a symbolic function for industriesas rein-
surance concerning the limits on their long-term liability exposureand
167 See id. at 11 (arguing that if the risk were to be transferred to the public this would
place environmentally superior operations at a competitive disadvantage).
168 Id. at 13.
169 Id.
170 See Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 31 (arguing that traditional tort liability
may provide meaningful deterrence against poor site selection and operation).
171 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 3031.
172 See supra Part I.C.
173 See, e.g., Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 388.
174 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4575.
175 Id.
176 See De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 655.
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for the public.177 The latter is, however, a double-edged sword. For exam-
ple, transferring liability for long-term stewardship to the government
could signal to the public that the industry may not be liable for (remain-
ing) long-tail risks, but could also provide reinsurance that, in the event
of damage, compensation (via government) would be available.178
Adelman and Duncan rightly plead for a realistic approach con-
cerning the possibilities and limits of liability rules for CCS.179 They
distinguish between the different functions of liability rules (prevention/
deterrence and compensation), address how these functions can play dif-
ferent roles in the various phases of the CCS life cycle, and mention
alternative regulatory instruments to liability rules that could fulfill this
role.180 For example, they argue that as a starting point liability rules
could provide meaningful deterrence against poor site selection and
operation.181 However, this deterrence function will mostly play a role in
the phases of the CCS project prior to long-term stewardship. Given the
fact that long-tail risks are relatively limited, liability for long-tail risks
would only offer nominal deterrence.182 From that perspective a transfer
of financial risk for the long-term stewardship should not necessarily
create a moral hazard risk for operators.183 Moreover, as we will subse-
quently argue,184 to the extent that liability rules do not provide perfect
incentives for deterrence, incentives could be provided through regula-
tory standards aimed at rigorous site selection, diligent project manage-
ment, and monitoring.185
Finally, as far as the goal of victim compensation is concerned,
other instruments than liability rules186 could be employed to provide
victim compensation.187 Using liability rules not for prevention but rather
for compensation often leads to a dilution of policy goals and may thus
create inefficiencies.188 Both operators and the public at large have there-
fore probably overstated the importance of liability rules189 with respect
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 19.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 31.
182 Id. at 6.
183 Id.
184 See supra Part II.D.
185 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 109.
186 See infra Parts IVV.
187 See Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 29.
188 Id.
189 See id. at 53.
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to prevention and compensation. This preventive role may be quite im-
portant until the phase of long-term stewardship; after that liability could
only provide nominal deterrence and would for that reason have very
little added value.
Finally, it should be stressed that models have been developed
that enable valuation and monetization of the risks involved with CCS.190
This is important since it shows that, notwithstanding uncertainties,191
there is sufficient scientific expertise available to determine the potential
damage resulting from CCS and develop optimal prevention standards.
B. Strict Liability or Negligence?
The economic approach to liability holds that in a so-called unilat-
eral accident model (where only the injurer can influence the accident
risk) both a strict liability and negligence rule provide incentives to
follow an optimal care level.192 In a bilateral care situation (where the
victim can also influence the accident risk) a contributory negligence
defense should be added to the strict liability rule to provide the victim
with incentives to take care as well.193 Additionally, the economic ap-
proach holds that it is important to provide incentives to parties to adopt
efficient activity levels.194
The activity level can be interpreted as any control variable not
taken into account in setting the optimal level of care.195 Under a negligence
rule an injurer has no incentive to adopt an optimal level of activity.196
This cannot be remedied because judges cannot easily incorporate the
optimal activity level into the due care standard.197
Since activity level changes are not included in the due care
standard, strict liability (with a defence of contributory negligence) will
encourage activity level changes for the injurer, while a negligence rule
190 See, e.g., Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38.
191 See supra Part I.G.
192 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 14 (1987); Steven Shavell,
Strict Liability versus Negligence, J.LEGALSTUD. (1980);William Landes & RichardPosner,
The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, GA. L. REV. 851 (1981).
193 See SHAVELL, supra note 192, at 14.
194 Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting, NATL BUREAU OF ECON.
RES. 44 (1980); Shavell, supra note 192.
195 Diamond, supra note 194, at 109.
196 Id. at 120.
197 It is difficult to determine both the optimal and the actual activity level. See, e.g.,
Polinsky, supra note 194, at 47; Shavell, supra note 192, at 2.
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will encourage activity level changes for the victim.Several authorssuggest
that in bilateral cases strict liability would be a superior device if it is more
important to give injurers an incentive to change their activity level than
it is to incentivize the victims.198 This implies that if the injurers activity
is very dangerous and creates a high accident risk, even if optimal care
is taken, e.g., if through use of explosives an injurer caused an old house
to collapse in the middle of a densely populated area, it would be more
desirable to control the injurers activity. Conversely, the advantage of
a strict liability rule disappears if the injurers activity is not important
enough to be controlled. For instance, if the injurer ran to catch a train
and collided with another pedestrian a negligence rule would be superior
because it is just as important to control the victims activity as it is to
control the injurers. If the activity of the injurer is not very dangerous,
if exercised with reasonable care, it is desirable to give the victim an
incentive to adopt an optimal activity level as well.
Even though a clear-cut test is difficult to give, Landes and Posner
describe several factors that may lead to a preference for a strict liability
rule.199 These elements are: (1) high expected accident costs; (2) the
impossibility that more care by the injurer would reduce the accident
risk; (3) the impracticability of constraining the victims activity in favor
of the injurers; and (4) the desirability to reduce the risk by changing the
injurers activity level.200
In sum, how do these economic arguments in favor of strict liabil-
ity apply to CCS? To some extent the analysis of liability for CCS-related
damage resembles the analysis of liability for environmental risks.201 The
risks created by CCS can in most cases be considered a unilateral acci-
dent, i.e., an accident whereby only the injurer can influence the accident
risk. In that case economic analysis predicts that the advantage of the
strict liability rule is that it will give the injurer an incentive both to
adopt an optimal activity level and to take efficient care.202 Since the
198 Landes & Posner, supra note 192, at 877; Shavell, supra note 192, at 7, 19.
199 Landes & Posner, supra note 192, at 907.
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., LUCAS BERGKAMP &BARBARA GOLDSMITH (EDS.), THE EUENVIRONMENTAL LIA-
BILITY DIRECTIVE: A COMMENTARY 3233, 3738 (2013); KRISTEL DE SMEDT, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LIABILITY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS (2007); Michael
G. Faure & Jing Liu, New Morals for the Compensation of Natural Resources Damage,
4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 261, 274 (201112); JING LIU, COMPENSATING ECO-
LOGICALDAMAGE:COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMICOBSERVATIONS 45 (2013); Barbara Pozzo,
The Liability Problem in Modern Environmental Statutes, 4 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 111 (1996).
202 BENJAMINJ.RICHARDSON,ENVIRONMENTALREGULATION THROUGH FINANCIAL ORGANISA-
TIONS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATION 16667 (2002).
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victim can, in most cases, not influence the accident risk,203 strict liability
seems to be the best solution to give the potential injurer optimal incen-
tives for accident reduction in those cases. It is, however, important to
add that in bilateral cases, even when strict liability remains preferred
because the injurer has the largest influence on the accident risk, it is
important to add a defense to take into account the victims behavior as
well.204 These arguments also justify the introduction of strict liability for
environmental harm,205 which many countries have proceeded to do.206
The arguments in favor of strict liability can, to a large extent,
also be found in theoretical literature on liability for CCS and also in
some legal systems.207 Adelman and Duncan mention that under Ameri-
can law, strict liability is favored when an activity is deemed to be ab-
normally dangerous.208 Even though they argue that CCS is in fact not
an abnormally hazardous activity, the unilateral nature of the activity,
also stressed in economic analysis, favors strict liability for CCS-related
damage.209 This would lead to strict liability for releases of CO2, as well as
for releases of brine.210 Several authors have analyzed the way in which
damage related to CCS is treated under particular legal systems and
found that, while different legal bases may constitute CCS-related liability
depending on the country, strict liability is the most common standard.211
This seems to not only be the standard in the United States212 but in
many European countries as well.213 In the EU the operation of storage
203 Id. at 166.
204 The operation of storage sites pursuant to the directive on the geological storage of
carbon dioxide has now been added to Annex III of Directive 2004/35/EC dealing with
environmental liability.
205 See LUCAS BERGKAMP, LIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW ASPECTS
OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 11950
(2001) (providing an overview of the justifications for strict liability).
206 See RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 165.
207 Id.
208 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 41.
209 Id. at 4344.
210 Id. at 5152 (arguing that there may be an argument for a negligence rule as far as the
liability for ex ante site selection is concerned). However, since harm is often indevisable
it may be more appropriate to use one generalised strict liability rule.
211 See De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 64952 (concerning American
law); Hoffman, supra note 133, at 53944.
212 Hoffman, supra note 133, at 539.
213 See INTL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: LEGAL AND REG-
ULATORY REVIEW (2nd ed., 2011) (summarizing the liability regime for long-term liability
for stored CO2 in various Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries).
2016] LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 415
sites pursuant to the CCS Directive has now been brought under the
framework of the Environmental Liability Directive.214 CCS storage has
been brought under Annex III of the European Liability Directive; as a
result, a strict liability regime applies to it as well.215
C. Liability or Regulation?
1. Regulation for CCS-Related Damage?216
The choice between regulation and liability rules was thoroughly
examined by Steven Shavell in a 1984 paper in which he advanced several
influential criteria.217 Shavell argues that when the government has bet-
ter information or can acquire information at a lower cost than private
parties; when there is a risk that the damage will be higher than the
wealth of an individual operator (and hence an insolvency risk may arise);
and when there is a danger that a liability suit will never be brought (e.g.,
because of problems of causation, proof, or latency) there may be a strong
preference for safety regulation.218
If one looks at the first criterion, that of information costs, it must
be stressed that assessing the risks of a certain activity often requires
expert knowledge and judgment.219 Small organizations might lack the
incentive or resources to invest in research to find out what the optimal
care level would be. Also, there would be little incentive to carry out in-
tensive research if the results were automatically available to competitors
in the market: this is the well-known free rider problem.220 This prob-
lem can be partially countered by legal instruments granting an intellec-
tual property right to the results of the research. However, it may not be
possible for small companies to undertake studies on the optimal technol-
ogy for preventing environmental damage. Therefore, it is often more
efficient to allow the government itself to do the research (e.g., in a gov-
ernmental research institute).221 The results of this research can then
214 See 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114.
215 Id.
216 See also Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 2427.
217 See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Shavell, supra note 192, at 27790.
218 Shavell, supra note 217, at 357.
219 Id. at 358.
220 Id. at 374.
221 Id. at 369.
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be passed on to the parties through regulation.222 Hence, setting stan-
dards in regulation can be seen as a means of passing on information
with the minimal technology required. Obviously, it is more efficient for
the government to acquire information on the optimal standard than it
would be for an individual firm to find out what additional reduction in
a particular CCS-related risk would produce the greatest reduction in
expected damages. There are undeniable economies of scale advantages
in regulation.223
The insolvency argument also points in the direction of regula-
tion. CCS-related risks can be caused by individuals or firms with fewer
assets than the damages that result from them.224 It should not be forgotten
that even a small firm could cause harm to a large number of individuals
and result in damages largely exceeding the firms assets.225 Moreover,
most firms have been incorporated as a legal entity and therefore benefit
from limited liability with respect to creditors,226 as individual sharehold-
ers are not liable to the extent of their personal assets.227
Also, the chances of a liability suit being brought for damage
caused as a result of CCS-related risks is normally very low. Whether
there are victims with an incentive to sue may greatly depend upon the
potential damage that could be caused by a CCS project. Especially with
human health impacts there is a danger that the damage may be spread
over a large number of people, who will have difficulty organizing them-
selves to bring a lawsuit. Additionally, the damage may only become ap-
parent years after the wrongful act took place. This is, as was previously
mentioned,228 the essence of CCS-related risks, i.e., long-tail risks, which
bring proof of causation and latency problems and only make it more
difficult to bring suit against whoever caused the risk.
The importance of regulation as a primary tool in preventing risks
emerging from CCS is also stressed in literature dealing with CCS-
related liability.229 An important reason why CCS literature hold that
traditional liability rules will not provide efficient incentives for preven-
tion relates to the potentially long-term nature of liability. Liability for
risks that may occur more than fifty years into the future may not have
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Shavell, supra note 217, at 369.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 362.
227 Id.
228 See supra Part I.F.
229 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11.
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a strong deterrent effect on decisions that have to be made ex ante.230
This has important consequences: (1) little would be lost as far as deter-
rence is concerned if operators were relieved from this long-term liability;
and (2) the fact that liability rules are weak, especially as far as long-tail
damage is concerned, is a strong argument in favor of ex ante safety
regulation.231 Shavells criteria, especially the risk of spinning off parts
of the business into small low capital companies and thus creating a
judgment proof problem, is considered a serious issue.232 The same goes
for the likelihood that a lawsuit would be brought as a result of damage
caused by CCS. Latency may substantially reduce the effectiveness of a
liability suit and, moreover, damage may be spread over a large number
of victims.233 It is well-known that in these types of situations the incen-
tives for a victim to file a liability suit are very small234: any personal
benefits from a lawsuit would be low, and given free rider problems, in-
dividuals would have no incentive to bring suits that could benefit every-
one.235 The only argument that may favor a liability framework would be
information asymmetry.236 But that would only favor liability rules if it
could be argued that operators would be better placed than the govern-
ment to assess the potential risks emerging from CCS.237
Other authors argue that liability rules alone are not able to
sufficiently control the risks posed by CCS238 and that a tailored regula-
tory structure is an important component of risk management.239 Direct
regulation of the conditions under which the various phases in the CCS
project life cycle are executed is crucial in reducing the residual risk-tail
for a particular CCS site.240 Many are hence in favor of installing a
230 Id. at 22.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 25.
233 Id.
234 This is referred to as the rational apathy problem. See Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The
Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Actions and Legal
Actions taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 183, 183213 (2000).
235 See Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive to Sue in a Costly Legal
System, 11 J.LEGALSTUD. 333 (1982); see generally Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geisteld,
The Diversions between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell,
Menell and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987).
236 Shavell, supra note 217, at 359.
237 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 61.
238 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 159 (arguing that tort liability (1) fails to detect and
assign blame for harm; (2) may lead to operator insolvency; and (3) is unable to provide
a remedy for long-tail risks).
239 Id.
240 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 89.
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private/public board that controls the elements influencing risk such as
proper siting, immediate corrective action, and early shutdown of highly
risky facilities.241 All authors agree that, notwithstanding the virtues of
a liability system, it cannot be the primary system of prevention. Ex ante
safety regulation will necessarily be the preferred instrument for draft-
ing and enforcing tailor-made safety regulations aimed at the reduction
of CCS-related risks.242 Moreover, given that research also indicates that
the preventive measures to be taken largely depend upon the specific
location and are hence site-specific,243 regulation should not be of a general
nature. The administrative instrument for enabling such an adaptation
of regulatory conditions to the specific site is obviously the permit or
license, through which regulatory authorities can lay down particular
safety standards.
2. Supplementary Role of Liability Rules
Although there are strong arguments for making safety regulation
the primary instrument for preventing CCS-related harm, there may still
be an important, although supplementary, role to be played by liability
rules. There are many reasons for this.244
The first point that is often stressed is that just because there are
many arguments in favor of ex ante regulation of CCS-related risks, it
does not mean the tort system should no longer be used for its deterring
and compensating functions.245 One reason to still rely on the tort system
is that the effectiveness of regulation is dependent upon enforcement,
which may be weak. Additionally, the influence of lobby groups on regu-
lation, which public choice theory has rightly highlighted, can to some
extent be overcome by combining safety regulation and liability rules.
Moreover, safety regulation, e.g., licences, can be quickly outdated and
often lack flexibility, which merits utilization of tort rules.246
241 Id. at 1416.
242 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 29 (The failure of common law regimes to deter
latent harms also places a high premium on effective ex ante regulation).
243 Liability, GLOBAL CCS INST., http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/carbon
-dioxide-capture-and-storage-and-unfccc-recommendations-addressing-technical-18
[http://perma.cc/BK65-R2X8] (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
244 See also BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 23336 (describing the interdependencies
between regulation and liability).
245 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 29.
246 The literature generally concludes, also with respect to environmental risks, that
liability and regulation should be combined in order to reach optimal deterrence. See
inter alia Patrick W. Schmitz, On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, INTL
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CCS-related risks also stress the importance of liability rules in
providing backup for regulatory failure.247 Especially where liability is
targeted not at long-term stewardship but at the near-term risks, it is
considered a useful complement to regulatory requirements.248 Given the
fact that regulation can be vulnerable to information gaps (in a situation
where operators possess better information on preventive measures than
regulators), liability rules could have an important deterrent effect.249 In
fact, the most important reason for liabilitys supplementary role is
related to the informational advantage of operators and to the rather
static nature of regulation.250 Since CCS is a new technology involving
many uncertainties251 it is possible that information on optimal technolo-
gies will evolve rapidly once more pilots are executed and experience on
risk preventive measures is acquired. Ideally this would lead to a rapid
adaptation of safety standards that would dynamically follow the newest
insights in technological developments. In practice, however, adaptation
of safety standards such as permits set by administrative agencies may
not be that easy, depending upon the legal system. The advantage of
exposing operators to strict liability is that this provides additional
incentives for investments in research and development and hence for
innovation of preventive technologies.
One consequence of the joint use of regulation and liability is that
regulation can, in those legal systems that still employ a negligence stan-
dard, inform the judiciary of the optimal level of care. Indeed, in many
legal systems a breach of a regulatory duty is automatically considered
unlawful.252 This is sometimes referred to as negligence per sé.253 The
advantage of this model is that the regulator in fact solves the informa-
tion deficiency for the judge. The judge only verifies whether the regulatory
standard has been breached. If that breach stands in a causal relation-
ship with the damage, the defendants liability will be established. It
REV. L. & ECON. 371, 371 (2000); Pierre Bentata & Michael G. Faure, The Role of Envi-
ronmental Civil Liability: An Economic Analysis of the French Legal System, 20 ENVTL.
LIABILITY,LAW,POLY,&PRACTICE 120, 12028 (2012) (providing empirical evidence with
respect to environmental liability in France).
247 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 35.
248 Id. at 46.
249 Id. at 53 (although the authors qualify the additional incentive provided by liability
in this case as limited).
250 Id.
251 See supra Part I.G.
252 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 40 n.219.
253 Id.
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moreover provides incentives to victims to prove that the regulatory
standard was breached. This both facilitates the burden of proof for the
victims (in a negligence setting), and makes the victim a de facto enforcer
of safety regulation. This is an example of a smart254 combination of
liability rules and regulatory standards. Of course, the question arises
as to whether compliance with regulations will automatically free an
injurer from liability; we intend to argue that this should not necessarily
be the case.255
In summary, regulation will be the primary instrument in control-
ling CCS-related risks. Liability rules can still play a role, but more as
a secondary backstop behind a comprehensive, preventive regulatory
framework.256
Now that the potential role of the liability regime for CCS-related
damages has been generally outlined, the next chapter will discuss a few
more detailed points concerning the shape of a possible liability regime.
III. POLICY OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO LIABILITY FOR
CCS-RELATED DAMAGE
A. Again: Goals and Limits of Liability Rules
Before discussing various aspects of how a liability regime for
CCS-related damage could be shaped, we should return once more to the
earlier discussion concerning the goals of a CCS liability system and the
importance of liability rules generally.257 The reason is that the particu-
lar way in which one wishes to shape a liability regime will strongly
depend upon the expectations one has concerning such a regime. Doubts
have already been formulated concerning the ability of the liability
regime to contribute to prevention, at least as far as long-tail risks are
concerned.258 In that respect it is striking that the literature concerning
CCS-related damages stresses the need to expose operators to liability
or risk the emergence of a moral hazard.259 Some claim that operators
254 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION, DESIGNING ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
255 See infra Part II.D.
256 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4576.
257 See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
258 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 22.
259 See, e.g., Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 3 n.7 (arguing that [m]oral hazard
refers to the specific situation where the risks of an unplanned event increase, because
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should be held financially responsible for deficiencies in their operational
methods and in the individual site characteristics,260 as granting opera-
tors broad-scale indemnity would create a moral hazard.261
Only Adelman and Duncan point to the fact that those earlier
studies all view the potential damages resulting from CCS in a rather
unbalanced manner and without sufficiently distinguishing between the
various phases in the life cycle of the CCS project. They first reference
the importance of regulation in the prevention of harm262 and argue that,
concerning long-term stewardship, there is in fact no moral hazard263 for
the simple reason that these risks are so remote that they provide hardly
any meaningful ex ante deterrence to operators behavior.264 That is not
an argument for totally excluding CCS operators from liability, but
rather for limiting their exposure to liability to the moment where the
long-term stewardship starts and liability is transferred to the state.
Operators would still be held fully liable for all damage that could emerge
up until that moment and would of course be able to choose appropriate
insurance or other coverage mechanisms.
This relates to the more general point mentioned in the introduc-
tion to the role of liability rules,265 which is that liability rules have to
balance both positive as well as negative externalities,266 a point that has
been made by Gilead.267 Those who only stress the negative externalities
that could potentially follow from a CCS project tend to forget the posi-
tive externalities (in terms of mitigating climate change) that CCS could
generate as well.268 Hence, a liability regime should be shaped in such a
way that positive and negative externalities are appropriately balanced.
If one were, for example, only to stress potentially negative externalities
and argue that operators should be held liable for losses that could emerge
at an undefined moment in time, this could lead to so-called crushing lia-
bility and result in socially desirable CCS activities not being undertaken
the responsible party is (partially) insulated from being held fully liable for resulting
harm. If CCS facilities are not held completely responsible for the consequences of their
actions, arguably they will be less careful in their siting and operating decisions.).
260 Dooley, Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 84, at 386.
261 Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4407.
262 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 20.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 See supra Part II.A.
266 Gilead, supra note 155, at 607.
267 Id. at 58992.
268 Id. at 592.
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at all. This dilemma has also been described by Trebilcock, who warns
that a combination of strict liability with joint and several and retrospec-
tive liability, especially in cases of long-tail risks, may lead to overly
defensive practices.269
B. Force Majeure
One question that is often asked in cases of ultrahazardous risks
to which strict liability regimes apply (such as nuclear liability) is whether
operators should still be held liable if the damage is caused by an act that
was beyond the control of the operator, often qualified as force majeure
or act of God.270 The basic premise of the economic analysis of tort law
is that exposure to liability should provide incentives for behavioral change,
i.e., for additional preventive measures.271 If force majeure is defined as
an act that is beyond the control of the operator, in principle, the opera-
tor should not be held liable for resulting damages since liability could
not have a positive effect on his incentives for prevention. However, this
requires a qualification for cases ofdamage causedbynatural hazards such
as flooding or earthquakes as these are hazards to which CCS sites could
be exposed and could potentially lead to substantial damage.272 The mere
fact that damage resulting from a CCS site is caused by a natural disas-
ter should of course not automatically exclude the operator from liability
to the extent that those events are reasonably foreseeable. A proper
location choice, which is (as previously mentioned) crucial for the preven-
tion of CCS-related risks, will take the possibility of flooding or seismic
events into account and hence avoid a CCS storage site in flooding zones
or earthquake prone areas.273 Only when expert opinion holds that a
particular natural hazard in the location of the site was reasonably
unpredictable should the operator be precluded from liability.274
269 See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social InsuranceDeterrence Dilemma of Modern
North-American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929, 93031 (1987).
270 See Michael G. Faure & Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent
Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: Who Compensates the Victims?, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POLY REV. 129, 133 (2012).
271 See Trebilcock, supra note 269, at 965.
272 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 27072.
273 Id. at 27374.
274 See also BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 53 (holding that foreseeability should be an
important requirement for liability. Hence, unforeseeability would, from that perspective,
preclude liability).
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Note that under the nuclear liability conventions operators are
only precluded from liability in cases where the natural disaster is of an
exceptional character.275 Similar language is used in the Japanese Act on
Nuclear Liability.276 The tsunami of March 2011 was, however, not con-
sidered a natural disaster of an exceptional character in that particular
region of Japan.277 As a result, the tsunami did not preclude the operator
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) from liability for the subse-
quent Fukushima nuclear disaster.278
The relevance of the force majeure exception is also discussed in
CCS-related literature. Since CCS storage sites in Europe were brought
under the Environmental Liability Directive through the CCS Directive,
it has been held that operators can be precluded from liability on the
basis of force majeure.279 However, the same authors hold that liability
would still be possible for earthquakes, which could be a significant type
of risk in relation to long-term CO2 storage.280 This shows that a natural
disaster does not automatically constitute force majeure. Of course, the
question will have to be asked whether the damage resulting from a
natural disaster was reasonably foreseeable (e.g., when the CCS storage
site was constructed in a flood prone area or in an area exposed to earth-
quakes).281 In those cases the site selection could be considered wrongful
275 The Paris Convention establishes a system of absolute liability. Classical exonerations
such as force majeure, acts of God, or intervening acts of third persons are no longer
applicable. The operator is not liable, however, for damage caused via a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character, unless the laws of the contracting party in whose
territory his nuclear installation is situated provide to the contrary. Similar stipulations
can be found under the Vienna Convention, which also regulates nuclear liability. See
LIU, supra note 201, at 21012.
276 If the nuclear damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional char-
acter or by an insurrection the nuclear operator can be exonerated from liability on the
basis of § 3 of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. See Act on Compensation
for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, § 3, available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law
/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C7VM-6MM3].
277 The government of Japan did not admit the earthquake and tsunami to be disasters
of an exceptional character. See Taiga Uranaka, Japan Says No Limits to Tepco Lia-
bility from Nuclear Disaster, REUTERS (May 2, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2011/05/02/us-japan-tepco-idUSTRE7412PK20110502 [http://perma.cc/HZP7-SDX9]; No
Limits for TEPCOs Liability in Fukushima Crisis, Japan Says, POWERNEWS (May 4,
2011), http://www.powermag.com/no-limits-for-tepcos-liability-in-fukushima-crisis-japan
-says/ [http://perma.cc/9MAG-VFBZ].
278 See Faure & Liu, supra note 270, at 192.
279 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 277.
280 Id. at 281.
281 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 37.
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and thus lead to operator liability.282 Only if the damage resulting from
a natural disaster were to be considered totally unforeseeable and not
preventable by reasonable measures taken by the operator would force
majeure preclude liability.283
C. Attribution of Liability
The issue of liability attribution has different angles. It basically
amounts to who should be held liable for CCS-related risks in cases where
many parties are involved.284 As was explained during the discussion on
the CCS project life cycle,285 there may be different parties in the various
phases of the CCS chain, differing more particularly between CO2 capture,
transportation, and storage. In this particular case we focus on storage,
whereby liability is mostly allocated to the licencee of the storage site,
i.e., the operator. One could ask whether, in the case of CCS, liability
should be channeled to the operator. In law and economics literature,
channeling is usually considered inefficient286 as it negatively affects the
incentives of parties who could influence the accident risk to take care.287
Channeling liability to the licencee is therefore generally rejected288 and
would not be recommended in a future liability regime concerning CCS-
related risks. There is only one example where a channeling seems
unavoidable: climate change liability for CO2 emissions.289 After all, if
there were no channeling this could theoretically lead to liability for all
operators who originally created the CO2 and sequestered it at the CCS
site. The costs of such an allocation might be prohibitive;290 hence, for
that particular damage liability can be channeled to the operator.291
282 Id.
283 This is, moreover, in line with U.S. case law concerning the question of whether
natural disasters constitute an excuse from environmental liability. For a detailed dis-
cussion, see Andri Wibisana, The Myths of Environmental Compensation in Indonesia:
Lessons from the Sidoarjo Mudflow, in REGULATING DISASTERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: LESSONS FROM THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 277354 (Michael
Faure & Andri Wibisana eds., 2013).
284 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 17879.
285 See supra Part I.F.
286 See, e.g., MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMIC
RISKS 127 (2003).
287 Id.
288 Id. at 12728. See also Michael J. Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of
Nuclear Accident Law, 17 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 215, 23235 (1997).
289 Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 35.
290 Id.
291 Id.
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D. Effect of Regulation
It was mentioned earlier that regulation would be the primary
tool for reducing CCS-related risks.292 The question then arises whether
following regulations or, say, permit conditions, would excuse an opera-
tor from tort liability. Although this is a highly debated issue,293 most
legal systems reject such a regulatory compliance defence.294
One can find a clear economic rationale for this rule. If compliance
with a regulatory standard or licence would automatically result in a
release from liability, the potential injurer would have no incentive to
invest in more care than the regulation asks from him, even if this could
reduce the expected accident costs.295
These reasons also seem compelling in the case of CCS. If compli-
ance with regulation were to free an operator from liability, liability
rules could not play their desirable supplementary role.296 Moreover, a
compliance with regulation defence would potentially make strict liabil-
ity meaningless,297 especially since safety requirements can develop
rapidly in such a volatile technological environment.
However, that is not to say that safety regulation does not have
an influence on operators exposure to liability. To the extent that safety
regulation is effective it would force operators to choose optimal loca-
tions, monitor risks, and implement safety standards that contribute to
prevention of risk exposure. Hence, compliance with efficient safety
standards could reduce operators exposure to liability (while not for-
mally precluding liability in the event damages occurred).298
E. Causation
Together with the question of whether regulatory compliance
affects liability, the way in which the law deals with causal uncertainty
292 See supra Part II.C.
293 For example, in the debate preceding the Environmental Liability Directive, Member
States could not reach agreement on this point; as a result, it is left to the Member States
whether to include such a compliance with permit defence or not.
294 Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Negligence, Strict Liability and Regulation
of Safety under Belgian Law: An Introductory Economic Analysis, 12 GENEVA PAPERS ON
RISK & INS. 95, 10910 (1987).
295 Id.; Shavell, supra note 217, at 365.
296 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 46 (arguing that liability can be a useful
complement to traditional regulatory requirements).
297 Faure & Van den Bergh, supra note 294, at 110.
298 See also Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 20.
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has an important bearing on the potential scope of operators liability.
Causal uncertainty is especially important with regard to so-called toxic
torts whereby a part of the population is exposed to hazardous sub-
stances or radiation and a certain disease, e.g., cancer, is subsequently
discovered.299 In these cases it is often not known which individual (among
a larger population) was victim of a tort and which received their disease
as a result of the background risk.300 Uncertainty often prevails, whereby
experts can only establish that there is a probability of, say, 40% that a
particular event caused a particular damage.301 Instead of the traditional
approach where the plaintiff has to prove that it was more probable than
not that the event caused the damage (i.e., more than 50%) legal systems
now increasingly use proportional liability.302 Under this standard, if
experts judge that the likelihood the tortfeasor caused the damage was
40%, he will be ordered to compensate 40% of the victims loss.303
Causation may also be an issue as far as the potential damage
resulting from CCS is concerned. The extent to which this is the case will
of course depend upon the nature of the particular damage.304 In the rare
instance of high concentrations of CO2 resulting in sudden death, it may
not be that difficult to establish a causal link with the CO2 release.
Causation may, however, become more difficult to establish for geological
impacts, particularly with respect to water resources. The more remote
these impacts, the more difficult it will be to prove the causal link.
Causation will be especially hard to prove in cases of atmospheric re-
leases giving rise to climate change liability. But with any causal uncer-
tainty, the most effective remedy is to rely on expert evidence concerning
the likelihood that a particular damage was related to the CO2 storage
site, and to translate that likelihood into a proportional amount of com-
pensation with which to award the victim. One way of doing that might
be to relate the liability to the amount of CO2 stored (if damages were
caused by different storage sites).305 In that way crushing liability (and
299 SeeJeffreyTrauberman,Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving Legal, Scientific and
Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 179200 (1983).
300 See Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach
to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 26271 (1960).
301 Problems related to causal uncertainty can especially arise in cases of environmental
liability; the solutions in many legal systems are not always very clear. See generally
MARK WILDE, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. (2nd ed. 2013).
302 See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 25.
303 See BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 28791, 36869.
304 See supra Part I.E.
305 See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 2425.
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thus overdeterrence) could be avoided by making the operator only liable
for the damage that was actually caused by the CO2 storage site. The
effectiveness of this system will, of course, to a large extent depend upon
whether experts are able to reasonably assess the likelihood that the
damage can be allocated to the CO2 storage site. In practice, this will
obviously give rise to debates.
F. Joint and Several Liability
To some extent, joint and several liability are the reverse of pro-
portional liability (or channeling of liability as previously discussed).306
Under joint and several liability, joint tortfeasors are held liable for all
the damage to which their behavior might have contributed.307 Joint and
several liability basically means that a victim can choose which operator
to sue and claim full compensation from one operator even when more
than one operator contributed to the loss.308
Joint and several liability regimes have often been introduced to
relieve the burden of proof from victims.309 Victims could collect the
entire damage from one of the contributing tortfeasors who could in turn
exercise recourse against the other liable parties.310 An argument in favor
of joint and several liability is that it gives potential injurers incentives
for mutual monitoring.311 However, if one of the actors were insolvent,
inefficiency may arise since recourse could become impossible.312 Joint
and several liability is controversial since an injurer could in principle
also be held liable for a portion of the damage not caused by his activity,
thus potentially increasing his liability exposure.313 Questions of joint
306 See supra Part III.C.
307 See Tom H. Tietenberg, Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several
Liability, 65 LAND ECON. 305, 306 (1989).
308 Joint and several liability was therefore meant to assist the judiciary in circumstances
where it was impossible to reasonably ascertain the relative contributions of different
parties. See RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 16364.
309 See BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 303.
310 Id.
311 See Tietenberg, supra note 307, at 306.
312 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages among Multiple
Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L. J. 831, 83237 (1989) (analyzing joint and several liability under
full solvency); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages among
Potentially Insolvent Actors, J. LEGAL STUD. 617, 62023 (1990) (analyzing instances of
insolvency).
313 For this reason joint and several liability for environmental harm is opposed by
Lucas Bergkamp, The Proper Scope of Joint and Several Liability, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
MILIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID 15455 (2000). See also BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 30003.
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and several liability obviously do not arise when there is only a single
operator, in which case attribution of liability is unproblematic.314 It is
only when multiple (potential) tortfeasors are involved either in different
phases of the project life cycle or operation of the storage site. Joint and
several liability increases the potential scope of liability for CCS opera-
tors.315 Therefore, Adelman and Duncan argue that the case for joint and
several liability in cases of CCS-related damage is weak.316 Given the
scale of these operations the number of potential defendants should be
traceable and joint and several liability could potentially lead to over-
deterrence.317 When considering the positive externalities generated by
CCS, policymakers may be cautious with the introduction of joint and
several liability for CCS operations.318
G. Long-Tail Risk: Limit in Time?
An issue that is extensively discussed in CCS-related literature
is the way in which liability law should deal with long-tail risks, given
the potentially long latency period of risks.319 As already mentioned there
seems to be a consensus that operators exposure to liability should
depend upon the different phases in the CCS project life cycle.320 For the
entire CCS sequestration, that is to say from the design and operation
(injection) until the closure and post-closure phase, all seem to agree that
operators should in principle be held liable.321 It is only as far as the long-
term stewardship is concerned, which can in principle take an indefinite
period of time, that operators should no longer be exposed to liability.322
This is strongly argued in a recent study by Adelman and Duncan,323
314 See David Gerard & Elisabeth J. Wilson, Environmental Bonds and the Challenge of
Long-Term Carbon Sequestration, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1097, 1099 (2009).
315 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 4243.
316 Id. at 4546.
317 Id.
318 For a similar conclusion with respect to environmental harm, especially in cases of
causal uncertainty, see BERGKAMP, supra note 205, at 30306.
319 See also Avelien Haan-Kamminga, Long-term Liability for Geological Carbon Storage
in the European Union, 29 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 309, 309 (2011); John Pendergrass,
Long-term Stewardship of Geologic Sequestration of CO2, 43 ENVTL.L.REP.10659, 1065960
(2013) (discussing the issues of long-term liability).
320 See supra Part II.C.
321 See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 35.
322 This refers to the last phase in the CCS project cycle as identified supra in Table 1 in
Part I.F.
323 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 22.
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which to some extent goes against earlier, less balanced studies324 that
seemed opposed to any type of preclusion of CCS operator liability.
Adelman and Duncan claim that, given the long latency periods, long-
term liability in fact offers only nominal deterrence.325 According to them,
liability for long-term stewardship after closure of the site should be
transferred to the government.326 They provide convincing economic
arguments for such a preclusion of liability, including the fact that any
future damages will be discounted to present value and thus have a very
limited deterrent effect.327 They even argue that these long latency peri-
ods could create perverse incentives to operators to manage their insol-
vency so as to avoid long-term liability.328 Given that liability is an
adequate instrument for targeting short-term risks, latency periods
substantially reduce the deterrent value of liability rules.329 It is there-
fore more useful to introduce a rigorous regulatory framework for ad-
dressing preventive measures aimed at the prevention of long-term
liability risk330 and limiting operator liability to the moment when the
site is transferred to the government. Moreover, in many legal systems
(such as the United States), a statute of limitations would put a limit on
the temporal liability of operators.331 De Figueiredo suggests a time limit
of ten years from the end of CO2 injection for operator liability.332
Others stress the importance of operators remaining liable during
the entire operational phase,333 which can include not only the phase of
operation (CO2 injection) but the period of post-closure monitoring as
well.334 Given that the period of operation (CO2 injection) could take one
to thirty years335 and the period of post-closure monitoring ten to thirty
years,336 operators could potentially be exposed to liability for a total of
eleven to sixty years. It is only for long-term stewardship that liability
324 In the sense of not clearly distinguishing between the different phases in the CCS
project life cycle.
325 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 6.
326 Id. at 20.
327 Id. at 2829.
328 Id.
329 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 46.
330 Based on the criteria discussed above supra Part III.C.
331 See De Figueiredo, supra note 93, at 38386.
332 Id. at 396.
333 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 15.
334 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 59.
335 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 8.
336 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 59.
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would, in this model, be shifted to the state.337 Others seem to agree with
this model, but argue that if a transition of CCS projects to the state
were to occur, operators would have to provide sufficient funds to cover
the costs of long-term stewardship.338 This also seems to some extent be
the approach followed at the policy level. For example, under the Euro-
pean CCS Directive, after the closure of a site, liability can be passed on
to the state when certain strict conditions have been metincluding the
provision of a financial contribution for the post-transfer period covering,
at a minimum, monitoring costs for the next thirty years.339 The IEA doc-
ument also states that liability could only be transferred to the operator
when (1) there is evidence that there is no significant risk of physical
leakage or seepage; (2) a minimum time period has elapsed from the
cessation of the injection; and (3) a financial contribution is provided for
the long-term stewardship of the site.340
These potential solutions seem to comply with the economic in-
sights mentioned earlier: some (rightly) argue341 that holding operators
liable out of principle reasons even during the period of long-term stew-
ardship may have no additional value as far as providing incentives for
deterrence. However, the foresight for industry to be held liable even in
this period of long-term stewardship could potentially create serious
barriers to start CCS projects as a result of which the positive externali-
ties resulting from CCS would not emerge. Sufficient incentives for in-
dustry would in the first place be provided through rigorous and effective
safety regulation. Moreover, the supplementary deterrent effect from
liability rules would still exist since operators would still be held liable
for a considerable amount of time during operation and during the post-
operation monitoring period. In that respect, differences of course exist
between the amounts of time mentioned in the literature342 and the ap-
proach followed at the policy levelfor example, in the CCS Directive.343
337 This period could, according to the literature, potentially be very long and even last
1,000 years. See Gerard & Wilson, supra note 314, at 1099.
338 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4581.
339 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 79.
340 IEA, supra note 213, at 9.
341 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 6.
342 For example, by Trabucchi and Patton, who refer to an operation period of thirty years.
Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 810. Also, by Adelman and Duncan, who seem to
add a period of post-closure monitoring of ten to thirty years. Adelman & Duncan, supra
note 11, at 59.
343 Where liabilities could be passed on to the state much more quickly, provided a
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Instead of focusing on discussions on the relevant periods, it is more im-
portant to stress that, differently than one may perhaps expect, a trans-
fer of long-term liability to the government should not necessarily be
opposed from an economic perspective for the simple reason that such a
long-tail liability will not provide additional incentives for deterrence.
Moreover, as will be argued below,344 liability for long-term exposure is
also largely uninsurable345 and would thus potentially expose operators
to uninsurable risks. In sum, the approach of limiting the liability expo-
sure of operators in time can be supported on economic grounds.
H. Remedies: Limit in Amount?
The question arises whether a financial limit (a so-called cap)
should be put on the amount of liability.
The arguments in favor of a cap are advanced in some literature,
either generally or to stimulate first movers. For example, De Figueiredo,
Reiner and Herzog argue, with the example of nuclear liability in mind,
that a liability cap may be desirable.346 However, they equally argue that
a liability cap could be detrimental to carbon storage from a public
perception point of view.347 This may give a wrong signal to the public
that CCS (like nuclear energy) is really a catastrophic type of risk and
can therefore lead to a stigmatization of CCS.348 Trabucchi and Patton
seem to be more generally in favor of liability caps. Referring to addi-
tional enabling legislation, they mention the need of introducing damage
thresholds,349 but they provide hardly any motivation. They refer to inter
alia the example of the Price-Anderson Act350 (regulating nuclear liabil-
ity) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,351 which equally have a limitation
financial contribution covering at least the costs for monitoring for thirty years is pro-
vided and other conditions are met.
344 See infra Part V.D.
345 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4581.
346 De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 652.
347 Id.
348 Id.; see also Haake & Marsh, supra note 50.
349 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 16. This would mean that operators would be re-
sponsible for consequences up to a dollar threshold per occurrence plus remediation costs.
350 For the compensation system under the Price-Anderson Act, see Michael Faure & Tom
Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the
US and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 219,
24045 (2008); see also LIU, supra note 201, at 23638.
351 See HUI WANG, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A COMPARATIVE
AND ECONOMIC STUDY ON THE INTERNATIONAL, US AND CHINESE COMPENSATION REGIME
20712 (2011), available at http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22278 [http://perma.cc/YJ47-BSD8]
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on liability.352 Also, Wilson, Klass, and Bergan argue in favor of liability
caps but only during the post-closure period.353 In another study, Klass
and Wilson provide a more balanced picture. They ultimately conclude
that generalized damage caps (which exist in the Price-Anderson Act for
Nuclear Liability) would not be appropriate for CCS as a general matter,
but only in the early years to encourage pilot projects.354 A general lia-
bility cap would undermine the credibility of CCS in the eyes of the
public,355 but a more limited cap may help first movers to manage the
financial risk of the new CCS technologies.356
Adelman and Duncan are, however, strongly opposed to liability
caps, even to promote first movers.357 They argue that financial caps are
unnecessary because the projected magnitude of the potential damage for
pilot projects would be limited; and moreover, it would not be the poten-
tial damage that would constitute the most important barrier, but rather
technological uncertainties.358 Those would not be removed with a finan-
cial cap.359 In that sense, liability caps would only have a symbolic value.360
Economic analysis strongly supports the arguments against finan-
cial caps. From an economic perspective it is important for the potential
injurer to be fully exposed to the social costs of his activities. Otherwise the
desirable internalization of the negative externality would not take place.
If the liability therefore is limited to a certain amount, the poten-
tial injurer will consider the accident as one with a magnitude of the
limited amount. Hence, he will spend on care to avoid an accident with
a magnitude equal to the limited amount, and he will not spend the care
necessary to reduce the total accident costs. Obviously, the amount of
care spent by the potential injurer will be lower, and a problem of under-
deterrence arises.361 The amount of optimal care, reflected in the optimal
standardbeing the care necessary to reduce the total accident costs362
(discussing the nature of the liability regime and the limitation of liability in the U.S. Oil
Pollution Act).
352 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 1721.
353 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4581.
354 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16465.
355 Id. at 168.
356 Id. at 171, 177.
357 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 64.
358 Id. at 6365.
359 Id. at 64.
360 Id.
361 WANG, supra note 351, at 31123.
362 See id. for a more detailed critical analysis of financial caps, especially in the context
of marine oil pollution damage.
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efficientlywill be higher than the amount the potential injurer will
spend to avoid an accident equal to the statutory limited amount.363 Thus,
as a result of the cap, too little care is taken.364
It should also be mentioned that in the areas where financial caps
on liability exist, such as for marine oil pollution and nuclear liability,
those caps are also heavily criticized in the literature.365 These economic
arguments therefore support Adelman and Duncan, who argue against
financial caps, both in general and also for pilot projects.366 Financial
caps may, as they argue, be unnecessary and ineffective.367 They could
also lead to undercompensation and underdeterrence as shown in eco-
nomic analysis. Moreover, they could equally have the undesirable effect
of signaling that CCS is in fact (like nuclear power) a highly risky activ-
ity which would thus precisely have the opposite effect of even reducing
public support for CCS.368 As a result, the liability of the operator should
in principle be unlimited in amount.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF FAIR AND EFFICIENT COMPENSATION
Until now, it has been stressed that from an economic perspective
the compensatory function is not the main goal of liability rules.369 More-
over, the limits of liability rules in providing compensation for CCS-
related damage were sketched. So far, the study has mainly addressed
how liability rules, but probably more importantly, their alternatives
(like standards and regulation), can provide incentives for prevention.
However, from a policy perspective, the compensation issue is important
as well. If CCS activities would cause damage victims will call for com-
pensation, given the political sensitiveness of and public support for CCS.
The remainder of this Article will hence focus on the question through
what type of instruments this compensation can be provided. However,
363 See Michael G. Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by
Nuclear Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions,
2 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 21, 28 (1995).
364 The reason for the underdeterrence is obviously the same as for the underdeterrence
which results from the insolvencyof the injurer.Underdeterrence arises because the injurer
is not exposed to full liability, either as a result of his insolvency or as a result of a cap.
365 See Faure, supra note 363; see also Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 288.
366 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 64.
367 Id.
368 See De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 652.
369 Michael Faure, A Multilayered Approach to Cover Damages Caused by Offshore
Facilities, 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 403 (2015).
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before addressing the different instruments, first the question will be
asked whether compensation fits at all into an economic framework of
accident law. Moreover, since prevention remains more important than
cure, the question also arises how compensation can be organized in such
a manner that it has positive effects for prevention or at least does not
negatively affect the incentives of the various stakeholders to invest in
prevention. After these general principles of fair and efficient compensa-
tion have been sketched in this section, the next parts will focus on the
various instruments that could be employed to provide compensation:
being insurance (V); alternative compensation mechanisms (VI); and
government intervention (VII).
A first important principle is that no matter how compensation is
organized, the incentives for preventing damage should always remain
intact.370 This means that, in principle, the duty to compensate should
rest upon the party who actually contributed to the risk; however, incen-
tives are also provided to potential victims to mitigate the damage.371
A second, related, principle is that a duty to contribute should
also be related to the amount in which a specific activity or entrepreneur
contributed to the risk.372 This remains important if a collectivization of
the compensation takes place. If such a risk differentiation is respected,
the compensation will give incentives for prevention to contributors.373
This is not only important from the perspective of operators, but also for
potential victims. This hence also means that in principle the individual
seeking a particular protection will pay for this protection to the extent
that he/she is exposed to the risk. Higher risks do from this perspective
pay a higher contribution to a financing solution than lower risks. Ac-
cording to this principle, there should be no shifting of risks and costs to
a collective.
The reason behind this principle is the idea that making individu-
als pay according to the risk they pose will make them aware of their
exposure to a particular hazard and may hence have a positive impact on
their behavior, i.e., provide incentives for prevention.374 Hence the effi-
ciency reason behind risk differentiation is to provide incentives for
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Moreover, these principles are not only important from an effi-
ciency point of view (providing optimal incentives for prevention to all
stakeholders in the risk), but also include a fairness element.376 Indeed,
if the principles were not followed, it would mean that good risks would
have to pay for the bad risks as well and would therefore in fact subsidize
bad risks.377 This negative redistribution should be avoided and therefore
a compensation mechanism (no matter how it is organized) should in
principle be financed by the parties actually contributing to the damage.
But again, risk differentiation also is important from the victims per-
spective. A solidarity on the basis of which all (tax payers) pay for those
exposed to risk could imply a redistribution whereby those who accepted
risk are rewarded by those who faced no risk.378
Such a solidarity may hence be at odds with efficiency and distri-
butional principles. However, it is easier to apply this risk differentiation
to potential injurers (to the extent that their contribution to the risk can
be established); it is much more difficult to apply this to potential vic-
tims. Indeed, in many developing countries, individuals may simply not
have another option than choosing to live in a hazard prone area (e.g.,
close to a CCS storage site).379 In such a case, a reverse argument could
be made, being that there would be a case in favor of providing compen-
sation for that individual (who apparently had no alternative solution
than to reside in the hazard prone area) from the collective. There is, in
that particular case, nothing inherently unfair about redistribution.
A third general principle is that, to the extent possible, a solution
should be introduced at the lowest administrative cost possible.
Fourth and finally, where possible, a competitive market solution
may (if it is less costly) be preferred to a bureaucratic intervention by
government. The market will usually be able to provide coverage at lower
costs.380 However, there may be some (perhaps exceptional) cases where
a government monopoly in the provision of disaster insurance could
provide better results than competitive markets.381




380 See Veronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiori, The Government as
Resinsurer of Catastrophic Risks?, 35 GENEVAPAPERS ON RISK&INSURANCE THEORY 369,
381 (2010).
381 This would more particularly be the case in Switzerland. For a discussion, see gener-
ally Winand Emons, Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies, 49 J. INDUS.
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V. INSURANCE
A. Demand and Supply
1. Demand
The demand for insurance will depend upon the attitude to risk
of the operator. Since the attitude to risk is strongly related to the wealth
of an individual, the degree of risk aversion will hence also depend upon
the available assets of the CCS operator. For relatively small expected
losses, a wealthy operator could be risk neutral and hence not have a
demand for coverage. In that case, the demand for insurance would only
emerge if insurers could manage, for example, claims handling more
effectively. It would then mostly be for the reduction of transaction costs
and not for risk aversion that insurance would be taken out.
The degree to which CCS operators have a demand for insurance
may hence strongly depend upon their own risk attitude which in turn
is related to their assets. Normally it is fair to state that especially for
smaller operators risk aversion is higher and hence a demand for some
type of coverage (insurance or alternatives)382 may emerge.
Generally, a distinction is made between two types of insurances;
there are on the one hand insurances that individuals take to protect
themselves against the future losses that they may suffer themselves,
either in their income or in their property.383 Fire insurance is a typical
example.384 These types of insurances are referred to as first-party
insurance.385 Insurances can also be taken for the risk that one has to
compensate damage suffered by a third party.386 These are therefore re-
ferred to as third-party insurances.387 A liability insurance is a typical
example of a third-party insurance. In that case the potential injurer
ECON. 247 (2001); Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Limits of Competition: Housing
Insurance in Switzerland, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1111 (1996); THOMAS VON UNGERN-
STERNBERG, EFFICIENT MONOPOLIES: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN
PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET (2004).
382 See infra Part VI.
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takes insurance against the risk he runs of having to compensate the
potential victim.388
In the case of CCS, both first-party and third-party insurance can
be relevant. First-party insurance will then be taken by the operator for
the property damage he could suffer to his installations. However, most
likely it will be a liability insurance that plays the most important role
in case of CCS. In that case coverage is demanded for the risk that
damage is suffered by a third party.389 Moreover, first-party insurance
may obviously play a role as well in order to protect particular victims of
CCS-related risks. In that case, victims do not take only first-party
insurance for the CCS-related risks but also general accident insurance
or property insurance, which may also serve to cover CCS-related risks
as long as they are not excluded from the insurance policy.390
2. Supply
Turning now to supply, an important condition for insurability
(both first-party and third-party) is that insurers have information on
the likelihood that the particular event will occur and on the potential
damage that may result from the manifestation of the risk. Insurers
generally acquire this information on the basis of a past loss history
recordin other words, statistics.391 If statistics on the past loss history
are not available, insurers will rely on risk assessment modeling to
assess the likelihood of the risk.392 Predictability is hence a crucial
requirement to keep a risk insurable, but a lack of predictability should
not immediately lead to the conclusion that risks are uninsurable. The
crucial question is whether insurers are able to cope with uncertainty by
charging an additional risk premium.393 However, the reaction of insur-
ers to calculate an additional risk premium obviously works only if there
is a willingness to pay by the insured. This willingness to pay will,
however, to a large extent depend upon the extent to which the insured
recognizes that there are, albeit uncertain, additional risks for which
388 Faure, supra note 383, at 1114.
389 Id.
390 Given that it concerns relatively new risks, one cannot see why insurers would ex-
plicitly exclude CCS-related risks from coverage. See RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 371
(on first-party victim insurance).
391 Faure, supra note 383, at 1114.
392 Id.
393 As has been suggested by Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth & Jacqueline Meszaros,
Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 7172 (1993).
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additional cover needs to be extended.394 If, as a result of information
deficiencies, the potential insured does not recognize these risks, he will
not be willing to pay the additional risk premium and insurance cover
will not take place. The same problem could also arise in the reverse case
where the insured holds that the new risk (like CCS) is in fact manage-
able and reasonably calculable, but he is not able to convey this message
to the insurer as a result of which the insurer charges an excessively
high-risk premium which the insured is not willing to pay. It may, more
particularly, be this lack of information (and the resulting unwillingness
to pay) which may explain why these additional risk premiums are
seldom charged. The result is more often that a market for the particular
new risk will simply not emerge or alternatives (e.g., risk-sharing agree-
ments) will be developed.395
3. Predictability of CCS-Related Risks
Applying these insights to the risks created in case of CCS, many
point at problems with uncertainty396 and lack of data. Klass and Wilson,
for example, indicate that some of the conditions of insurabilitymore
particularly related to predictability of the risk and a well-established
time periodmay not be met in the case of CCS;397 moreover, there may
be legal uncertainty in the current situation as well.398 Legal uncertainty
may more particularly exist in those legal systems that have not suffi-
ciently clarified the exposure to risk of CCS operators in the different
phases of the CCS project life cycle.399 It is more particularly a fear for
liability also in the phase of long-term stewardship that may create the
legal uncertainty which could endanger insurability. Trabucchi and Patton
therefore point again at the CCS project life cycle and argue that in the
phases before sequestration (hence the capture and transport) transfer
of risk to a third party (more particularly an insurer) may be possible,400
but that especially as far as the risks related to the sequestration are
394 Id.
395 The advantage of a risk-sharing agreement is that operators themselves may, better
than insurers, be able to obtain accurate information on the exposure to risk and thus
cure the information asymmetry.
396 See also supra Part I.G.
397 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 163.
398 Id. at 164.
399 Id.
400 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 89.
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concerned, the lack of real, readily accessible data may make the predict-
ability of the risk difficult.401
Doubts are especially formulated with respect to the ability of
insurance to cover long-term liability since especially the long-term lia-
bility may endanger insurability.402 On the other hand, some indicate
that although uncertainties about risks will remain even under the best
of circumstances, this does not mean that an ex ante valuation of the risk
would be impossible.403 It is said that site specific risk analysis may be
possible and could provide information on the specific risks related to one
particular site.404 It is even argued that it is possible to make probabilis-
tic estimates of the expected loss values for every specific site based on
a site-specific risk assessment.405 This is confirmed in other research
where it is even said that the risks related to CCS are known, predict-
able, and manageable.406 These rather optimistic statements are of a
very general nature and do not distinguish between the different phases
in the CCS project life cycle. One has the impression that those state-
ments about the possibility of risk assessments and hence the predict-
ability of the risk especially apply to the risks that may arise during the
operation and probably the post-closure monitoring period, but less to the
uncertain period of long-term stewardship. Therefore, in policy docu-
ments, it is also held that insurance can basically only play a role during
the operation of the plant.407 Also, the EU CCS Directive still involves
large uncertainties for operators408 inter alia concerning the moment
when the legal liability will be transferred from the operator to the state.
Those factual and legal uncertainties may also endanger insurability.
B. Capacity
An important condition for the insurability of any risk is not only
that the risk should be predictable; in addition, the insurer must also
have sufficient capacity in order to have money available once the risk
401 Id. at 10.
402 See De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 654.
403 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11, at 17.
404 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 13.
405 Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 389, 391.
406 Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4407.
407 See IEA, supra note 213, at 12 (arguing that insurance is generally considered to only
be appropriate during the operation of the plant but may not be applied indefinitely
across the post-closure phase).
408 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 7, 9.
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would materialize.409 That may more particularly be a problem when
there is only a relatively small number of insured interested in the
product that the insurer wishes to sell. Not only may the small number
of insured (especially in the initial phase of developing a CCS project) be
problematic, the same is the case for the high barriers to market entry
created by the need for expert knowledge in CCS-related risks and for
creating sufficient capacity. For CCS, that may obviously limit the
insurability of the risks. It could therefore lead to a situation in which
the total pool of insured is relatively too small and that not enough
insurance capacity could be generated to cover the loss when it would
occur. The economic principle is simply that the total amount of premi-
ums generated by the pool of insured should be large enough to cover the
potential risk when it would materialize.410 This is obviously more diffi-
cult when the number of insured is small and, like in the case of CCS,
the potential damage could be quite substantial. Obviously, these prob-
lems are larger in the initial phase of the development of CCS and may
disappear when more experience with CCS projects is obtained and more
operators participate in the market.411 However, one should not judge too
quickly that the large magnitude of the potential damages makes the
risk uninsurable. There are quite a few techniques that insurers can use
to make risks with a large potential magnitude insurable.
A first possibility is to use co-insurance. This simply amounts to
the possibility of many insurers jointly covering one particular project.412
If there were one CCS site to be covered, four insurers could decide to
cover the risk together, each covering 25%, thus being able to generate
higher capacity.
Another obvious solution to deal with the capacity problem is
reinsurance. Through reinsurance an insurer effectively shifts a part of
his risk to a reinsurance company in exchange for a reinsurance pre-
mium.413 Large risks like CCS-related risks could be reinsured through
the international reinsurance market, thus creating higher capacity.
A third possibility is pooling by insurers. This has to be distin-
guished from pooling by operators, which is usually qualified as a risk-
sharing agreement.414 In the case of pooling by insurers, insurance
409 In simple words: insurers need to hold sufficient financial resources to meet the claims






2016] LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 441
companies decide to cover a particular risk on a non-competitive basis for
an entire sector.415 A risk where pooling by insurers typically takes place
is the nuclear risk.416 Insurance of nuclear risks is provided through the
so-called nuclear pools.417 Since those risks were considered to be very
large, the major national insurance companies in every nuclear country
decided to pool their resources in the 1950s on a non-competitive basis
in order to be able to provide coverage for them.418 These pools provide
cover for the third-party liability and to some extent first-party insurance
for the damage caused to the nuclear power plant as well.419 Pooling is
not only used in nuclear liability insurance but also with other risksfor
example, with environmental liability insurance.420 Environmental pools
exist in many countries.421 However, pooling between insurance compa-
nies may be problematic from an insurance perspective since insurance
companies pool their resources on a non-competitive basis and thus ex-
clude the normal competitive process.422 The (European) competition
authorities have increasingly paid attention to those pools, especially
examining the compatibility of pooling by insurers with European compe-
tition policy.423 A recent study that has been executed on behalf of the
European Commission has also examined the amount of co(re)-insurance
pools currently available in Europe.424 The study identified a total of
fifty-one pools, many of which focus on catastrophic risks (such as nu-
clear, environmental, and terrorism related risks).425 The CCS-related
literature has also pointed at the possibility of pooling by insurance
operators and has in that respect argued that antitrust waivers for
participating parties may be necessary.426 Antitrust waivers may perhaps
415 See, e.g., Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Liability for Nuclear Accidents in
Belgium from an Interest Group Perspective, 10INTL REV.L.&ECON. 241, 25051 (1990).
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 For details, see id.
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 See generally Faure & Van den Bergh, supra note 415.
422 Id.
423 See Commission Regulation (EU) No. 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to certain
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector.
424 EUR.COMMN AND ERNST &YOUNG,STUDY ON CO(RE)-INSURANCE POOLS AND ON AD-HOC
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be too strong a suggestion. Even within the boundaries set by competi-
tion policy, it should be possible to, on the one hand, enjoy the benefits
of cooperation from pooling and, on the other hand, still have the benefits
of competitionmore particularly when not just one insurance pool
covering CCS-related risks would be created, but rather different pools
between which competition would still exist.
C. Risk Differentiation
Insurability requires that two important dangers, being moral
hazard and adverse selection, are remedied.427 Moral hazard in insurance
refers to the phenomenon that the behavior of the insured injurer will
change as soon as the risk is removed from him.428 Moral hazard can
especially be a problem in case of liability insurance. Moral hazard can
be controlled by either monitoring the behavior of the insured and adapt-
ing the premium correspondingly or to still expose the insured partially
to risk.429 This of course requires a differentiation of the policy conditions
to the particular risk. These principles of course apply in a similar way
to CCS-related risks as well. It was already mentioned that the CCS
literature refers to the danger of moral hazard430 as follows:
Moral hazard refers to the specific situation were the risks
of an unplanned event increase, because the responsible
party is (partially) insulated from being held fully liable
for resulting harm. If CCS facilities are not held com-
pletely responsible for the consequences of their actions,
arguably they will be less careful in their siting and oper-
ating decision. Therefore, the incentive to capture, trans-
port site characterise, and inject carbon dioxide in an
environmentally sound and protective manner may be
diminished. The potential for risk increases because the
chances of an unpredictable event occurring due to poor
siting/operating decisions increase.431
427 RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 354. On moral hazard and adverse selection in in-
surance, see generally Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, in TORT LAW
& ECON. 377, 38692 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
428 See generally Wagner, supra note 427.
429 Id. at 38992; Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 95 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 54162 (1979).
430 For a detailed description of moral hazard for the case of CCS-related risks, see
Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26.
431 Id. at 22 n.7.
2016] LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 443
They apply this moral hazard to the lack of exposure to liability,
but the same moral hazard could obviously arise if full insurance cover
were available.
However, although the CCS-related literature indicates that moral
hazard may be an issue in case of CCS (thus stressing the need for pro-
viding appropriate incentives for prevention), the literature equally indi-
cates that there are ample possibilities of risk differentiation, which
could thus remedy the moral hazard risk.432 It is mentioned that it is very
well possible to identify different risk profiles on the basis of the type and
upkeep of a storage site.433 As we also made clear above, the CCS-related
literature clearly shows that the technological knowledge is developed to
such an extent that it is possible to differentiate the risk prevention mea-
sures that operators can and should take434 and that hence differentiated
premiums could be charged based on the differing technical characteris-
tics of the site and the type of operation.435 In principle, a comprehensive
system of mapping and ranking of potential sequestration sites would be
possible.436 Such a mapping and ranking could obviously be used by in-
surers to apply an adequate system of risk differentiation.437 Like with
ordinary environmental insurance, insurers can rely on compliance with
third-party environmental management systems, certification, or ISO
standards to verify the adequacy of the preventive measures taken by
operators.438
It has often been mentioned that as far as environmental insur-
ance is concerned, an important role can be played by regulation.439
Regulatory requirements with respect to siting of CCS facilities, opera-
tion, and post-closure monitoring440 are important elements that can all
be laid down in regulation. In that respect, properly tailored regulation
432 See generally id.
433 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 11.
434 See supra Part I.D.2.
435 See, e.g., Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11 (indicating that risk differentiation is
possible on the basis of the choice of the sequestration site, but also the care measures
taken during the operation).
436 See id. at 60 (which according to them should be neither technically demanding nor
cost-prohibitive).
437 See id. at 14 (mentioning that a risk profile of the particular site and operator has to
be designed and operational risk management systems need to be demanded.).
438 RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 364.
439 The importance of regulation of CCS was already stressed above in Part III C.
440 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 16 (who also in that respect see an im-
portant role for a public-private CCS safety board).
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can assist the risk differentiation by the insurer.441 Given the informa-
tional advantage of the regulator (most insurers probably not being
specialized in CCS-related risks), ex ante regulation can have the major
advantage that (as most insurers do) the insurer can primarily require
the CCS operator to comply with regulatory standards.442 Violation of
regulatory standards by the insured will often be a cause for refusal of
coverage or for a recourse action by the insurer.443 This shows again the
importance of a smart collaboration between the regulator and the insurer
whereby, on the one hand, the regulator informs the insurer about mini-
mum safety standards (laid down in regulation) and, on the other hand,
the insurer becomes de facto the enforcer of regulatory standards. The
promulgation of ex ante regulatory standards can thus facilitate risk
differentiation by the insurer and in that way contribute to an important
extent to the insurability of the CCS-related risk.
D. Insurability of CCS?444
Should, taking into account the criteria for insurability discussed
above, CCS-related risks be considered insurable or not? As the CCS-
related literature has made clear, it is probably wrong to put the ques-
tion in those general terms since it very much depends on the different
phases of the CCS project life cycle.445 Depending upon the phase of the
CCS project, there may be particular problems that could endanger the
insurability of CCS-related risks and more particularly the risk of liabil-
ity towards third parties for CCS-related damage. Looking at the criteria
we have discussed above for insurability of risks, there could be a serious
problem of insurer ambiguity, i.e., the problem that CCS is a new tech-
nology and that hence actuarially reliable information on CCS-related
risks may to a large extent be lacking. There can be high uncertainty
concerning the specific probabilities of damage, as well as on the poten-
tial magnitude of the damage if the risk would materialize.446 There may
441 See RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 36066.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 On the insurability of other unconventional oil and gas extraction methods, see David
A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution:
Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 152393 (2014).
445 See supra Part I.F.
446 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 13; see also supra
Part II.G (on the discussion of uncertainties relating to CCS-related risks).
2016] LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 445
hence be considerable information deficiencies which may reduce the
appetite of insurers for CCS-related risks.447 Insurer ambiguity may lead
to reduced supply or, if the risk is covered at all, high premiums corre-
sponding to the insurer ambiguity.448 If, however, that high-risk premium
does not correspond with the risk perception of operators, there may be
no corresponding willingness to pay those high premiums and a market
for covering the particular risk may not emerge.449
In addition, capacity may be a serious problem as well since the
potential number of players is (at least at this moment) limited and the
potential damage could be quite large.450 Some of the traditional reme-
dies to create larger capacity (co-insurance, reinsurance, and pooling by
insurers) could be employed, but still it is uncertain whether those would
be able to generate the substantial amounts that may be necessary to
cover the damage which could result from CCS-related risks.
Lacking information on the side of insurers is not only a problem
as far as fixing an adequate premium and predicting the risk is con-
cerned, but also for the necessary risk differentiation in order to cure the
dangers of moral hazard and adverse selection. However, it was held that
the regulator can in that respect help insurers and thus promote the
insurability of CCS-related risks by providing a tailored regulatory frame-
work on which insurers could largely rely to judge CCS-related risks and
differentiate premiums accordingly.451
Looking at the specific phases of the CCS life cycle, there are
considerable differences. To put it simply: traditional (environmental)
insurance is good in insuring sudden and accidental events and is less
suited for the so-called long-tail risks.452 This can be understood: given
the asbestos nightmare, insurers dislike risks that could expand very
long in time and create potential risk exposures for many decades.453
Looking at the CCS project life cycle, it can therefore be held that (if the
other problems mentioned above could be cured) insurance may be
available for the injection and operation phase, but may already become
447 See Implementation of Directive 2008/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide,
Guidance Document, EUR. COMMN 4, 6 [hereinafter Guidance Document 4] (where it is
suggested that lack of sufficient knowledge about the behaviour of sequestrate CO2 also
will inhibit insurance offerings.).
448 Id.
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more difficult during the post-closure monitoring (where probably other
alternatives will have to be examined) and will totally be excluded in
case of long-term stewardship (for which liability should anyway be
transferred to the state).
Also, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Financial
Responsibility Guidance mentions that insurance companies may not be
willing to underwrite policies for the entire life of a project which could
last for a minimum of fifty years.454 That is why most of the literature re-
lated to CCS holds that as far as the long-term stewardship of storage sites
is concerned the storage site should (under specific strict conditions)455
be transferred to the state.456
As far as insurability is concerned, a similar conclusion can
therefore be reached as with the exposure of liability in time: it was held
above that exposing operators to the long-tail risk, more particularly to
the damage which might occur during the period of long-term steward-
ship, does not seem useful as it may not provide ex ante the incentives for
prevention.457 When discussing the same issue here from an insurability
perspective a similar conclusion is reached, i.e., that liability for damage
that could occur during the period of long-term stewardship should also
be excluded because such liability exposure may be uninsurable.458
CCS-related literature is equally pessimistic concerning the
current possibilities of insurance cover for CCS-related risks. For example,
Wilson et al. hold that CCS might violate many of the conventional rules
of insurability.459 Conventional insurance requires: (1) a sufficient num-
ber of similar and uncorrelated events to allow for risk pooling; (2) clearly
calculable losses; (3) a well-established time period for potential losses;
(4) frequent enough losses to calculate premiums; and (5) that the insured
party has no incentive to cause the loss.460 CCS may violate many of those
conditions,461 as we illustrated. Also, in policy documents it is therefore
454 Insurance companies would usually underwrite policies with maximum terms of five
to ten years that can be renewed. See EPA, GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON
DIOXIDE 18 (July 2011).
455 Which are, for example, laid down in the CCS Directive.
456 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 79; Trabucchi &
Patton, supra note 26, at 15.
457 See supra Part II.G.
458 Id.
459 Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4580. They refer more specifically to the
lack of experience with large-scale CCS and inherent geologic heterogeneity which may
create problems.
460 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 163.
461 Id.
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held that de facto specific policy terms and conditions have not yet been
made available for a cover for CCS-related risks as a result of which
precise terms and limits of coverage cannot be determined.462
As a result of those observations, there may only be a limited role
for insurance to cover CCS-related risks. Insurance could only play a role
in the phase of injection and operation and most likely not in later phases.
Moreover, insurance could only play that role if particular problems,
discussed in this section, would have been adequately addressed. Given
those limits of the traditional insurance markets in providing cover for
CCS-related risks, there may be good arguments to examine whether
alternative compensation mechanisms may be able to overcome some of
the problems of traditional insurance markets.
Finally it should be mentioned that not many insurance compa-
nies seem yet willing to provide policies covering CCS-related risks.463 In
the literature only two Swiss companies (Zürich and Swiss Re) are men-
tioned as offering insurance policies for CCS-related risks.464
VI. ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MECHANISMS
As we just explained that traditional insurance markets may not
be able to cover CCS-related risks in a satisfactory manner (or only to a
limited extent), the question arises whether alternative compensation
mechanisms could be used that could better deal with some of the prob-
lems that traditional insurers are confronted with in covering CCS-
related risks. The search for alternative compensation mechanisms is not
new. The CCS-related literature has largely addressed whether other
instruments like bonding or a special fund could better deal with CCS-
related risks than insurance.465 Also, in policy documents, it is realized
that insurance may have its limits in providing financial security for
CCS-related risks as a result of which many alternatives like funds,
escrow, bank guarantees, and letters of credit are examined.466 Also in
the EPA Financial Responsibility Guidance Document, a variety of
alternatives to insurance is mentioned that operators or owners can use
to satisfy financial responsibility, such as the use of trust funds, surety
bonds, letters of credit, escrow accounts, or self-insurance.467
462 See Guidance Document 4, supra note 447, at 7.
463 Havercroft and Macrory referred to a 2012 report holding that off the shelf insurance
solutions for CCS liability would not exist. Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 36.
464 See Aldrich, Koener & Keith, supra note 58, at 10.
465 See, e.g., Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4578.
466 See Guidance Document 4, supra note 447, at 46, 2628.
467 See GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454, at 9.
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Within the scope of this Article, a few interesting alternatives will
be addressed, also because they have been discussed in CCS-related
literature. First, attention will briefly be paid to self-insurance (A); next,
the potential of risk-sharing agreements will be explored (B), as well as
the possibilities of guarantees and deposits (C). In this part, first the
theoretical ability of a particular alternative compensation mechanism
will be explained; next, a critical evaluation of the comparative strengths
and weaknesses of the particular mechanism will be discussed, especially
in the light of its possible application to CCS-related risks.
A. Self-Insurance
1. Theory
Self-insurance is a mechanism whereby larger players in the mar-
ket do not take insurance coverage at all but run the risk themselves.468
In fact, self-insurance can take two different forms. One is pure self-
insurance, which in fact is nothing else than major companies constitut-
ing a reserve for future losses.469 In a technical sense, this cannot be
considered as insurance for the simple reason that there is no risk spread-
ing, no risk distribution, and hence no loss spreading after an accident
happens.470 Self-insurance in that sense is merely a reserve for potential
losses whereby operators use their balance sheet to guarantee payment
in case a major accident would happen. Reserves do allow for a risk spread-
ing in time but not between various parties exposed to a risk.
Another possibility is the creation of a so-called captive.471 A
captive is in fact an insurance company that is created by industry.472
Many large oil and gas operators have created their own insurance com-
panies (referred to as captives).473 The reason for doing so is that, in this
way, they can satisfy a statutory duty (in the countries where this exists)
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 286, at 144.
471 See, e.g., PAUL A. BAWCUTT, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, ESTABLISHMENT, OPERA-
TION AND MANAGEMENT (1991); see also TONY DOWDING, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
CAPTIVE INSURANCE (1997).
472 See Lucas Bergkamp, Nicolas Herbatchek & Suriya Jayanti, Financial Security and
Insurance, in THEEUENVIRONMENTALLIABILITY DIRECTIVE:ACOMMENTARY 118, 12829
(Lucas Bergkamp & Barbara J. Goldsmith eds., 2013).
473 Id.
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to show financial coverage but avoid that a transfer of fund to a third
party (the insurance company) would be necessary.
2. Evaluation
Self-insurance (either via reserves, captives, or using the capital
market) obviously has several strengths and weaknesses.
The advantage from the industrys perspective is obviously that
it is a relatively low-cost solution; operators can take care themselves of
providing guarantees for future losses and do not have to transfer risks
to an insurance company which may create additional transaction costs.474
Moreover, for major operators, forcing them to shift risks to an insurance
company may make little senseespecially in cases where the credit rating
of the operator is in fact higher than that of an insurance company.475
Moreover, using self-insurance at least partially has an advantage
in curing the so-called moral hazard risk that will always emerge in case
of insurance: by taking a substantial retention the operator will still be
exposed to risk as a result of which moral hazard (created through in-
surance) can be controlled.476
The disadvantages of self-insurance (no matter what form it
takes) may also be obvious: self-insurance is obviously not necessarily a
waterproof guarantee against insolvency.477 That would only be the case
if regulation could guarantee that the money set aside for covering the
CCS-related losses would only be used for that specific goal. Moreover,
self-insurance could hence lead to an externalization of risk in case of
insolvency.478 Smaller operators without strong balance sheets or credit
rating could simply run the risk of liability, and if the risk materialized
they would simply pass on the costs to the tax payer.479 Self-insurance
can hence only be considered ineffective financial security if guarantees
can be provided that the reserves set aside will actually be used for the
potential losses for which they were earmarked. Otherwise, the risk
would also exist that in case of insolvency, the trustee in bankruptcy
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477 RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 373.
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Self-insurance could be a valuable strategy for major players that
would be engaged in CCS, such as large energy companies with substan-
tial balance sheets. For smaller and medium-sized players, self-insurance
could only play a role as a deductible, in addition to other hedging strate-
gies. If self-insurance would be offered by operators as a financial guar-
antee, serious controls should therefore be imposed to verify the viability
of the self-insurance as a reliable guarantee.480 This is why in the EU
policy document with respect to the financial security for CCS self-
insurance is in fact considered as the most risky option because no pro-
tection is provided from claims of creditors.481 Self-insurance is equally
mentioned in the EPA Financial Responsibility Guidance Document.482
According to this document, owners or operators can expect to provide
documents such as annual financial statements that show profits and
losses for the year and statements verifying total net worth and network-
ing capital, to be confirmed by an independent auditor.483 It is the Under-
ground Injection Control (UIC) program director who will decide whether
the information submitted is sufficient to make a determination on the
owners or operators financial stability.484 The EPA Guidance Document
considers self-insurance beneficial for owners or operators because it is
likely to have the lowest overhead costs.485 However, there is a high risk
of failure, especially in the post-injection site care period since in that
period the injection site is no longer in operation and profitable.486 The
Guidance Document moreover provides recommended specifications con-
cerning self-insurance holding inter alia that the owner or operator should
have a tangible net worth of at least $100 million; specific ratings by credit
rating agencies would be required as well.487
480 Financial tests would thus have to be developed to assess an operators financial
capability to face liability for CCS-related risks. For a comparison with the financial
security under the Environmental Liability Directive, see Bergkamp, Herbatchek &
Jayanti, supra note 472, at 128.
481 See Guidance Document 4, supra note 447, at 27 (mentioning that certainty also
depends on stringency of required financial tests.).
482 In the definitions, it is held that self-insurance allows the owner or operator to submit
financial statements and other information to prove that they are likely to remain in
operation, based on indicators of the economic health of the organisation, and that they
will be able to complete all required GS activities. See GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF
CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454, at x.
483 Id. at 8.
484 Id. at 89.
485 Id. at 19.
486 Id. at 22.
487 Id. at 3638.
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B. Risk-Sharing Agreements
1. Theory
A risk-sharing agreement or a pool is a system whereby operators
mutually agree to share each others losses. It resembles insurance, but
there are, as will be explained in more detail, a few fundamental differ-
ences. The basic difference is that insurance involves a third party (the
insurance company), whereas in a risk-sharing scheme the operators are
both insured and insurer; there is hence no involvement of a third party.488
Unlike in the case of commercial insurance, where ex ante infor-
mation about the probability of a certain risk and its magnitude should
be available to allow the calculation of an ex ante charged premium, in
a risk-sharing agreement policy, each members contribution can be agreed
upon beforehand and only actually paid ex post.489 This characteristic
makes it possible for a risk-sharing agreement to deal with uncertain risk,
for which the statistical data about the occurrence are rare or the proba-
bility and size is less predictable. As long as a risk differentiation can be
made among the members, a risk-sharing agreement can be feasible, since
an ex ante charging of premiums is no longer necessary. Only the relative
contribution of each member to the risk has to be known.
Another difference between a risk-sharing agreement and insur-
ance concerns the costs. In an insurance policy, the risk is shifted to the
insurer at the price of a premium.490 The premium is not recoverable by
the insured no matter whether the insured risk materialized or not.491 In
a risk-sharing agreement, a member only contributes if an accident
happens; the duty to compensate can either be postponed or the contribu-
tion can be carried over to the following year if there is no accident.492 A
member can also recover his contribution by not creating the risk and
leaving the pool.493
488 Jason E. Doucette, Wading in the Pool: Interlocal Cooperation in Municipal Insurance
and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing PoolsA Survey, 8 CONN. INS.
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2. Pooling in the Price-Anderson Act
Many examples of pooling arrangements exist.494 It is, however,
interesting to briefly discuss risk pooling in the Price-Anderson Act since
that model has equally been mentioned as an interesting example in the
CCS-related literature.495
In the United States, nuclear liability is governed by the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957,496 which has been revised approximately every
decade.497 According to the Price-Anderson Act, each license issued should
have and maintain a financial guarantee to cover public liability claims.498
The existing capacity of the insurance market (provided by a mo-
nopolistic national pool, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)) to provide
is $300 million.499 If an accident creates damage in excess of $300 million,
a retrospective premium needs to be called upon all American nuclear
operators licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).500
This premium is payable in annual instalments up to a certain maximum
amount per incident per power plant and is determined according to the
size and number of reactors each plant has.501 In October 2008, the NRC
adapted the amounts in the second tier to inflation and set the amount
at $111.9 million, with a maximum annual retrospective premium of
$17.5 million per reactor per year.502 Regarding the first tier, American
nuclear insurers decided to make available from 1 January 2010 a maxi-
mum limit of $375 million for domestic nuclear third-party liability. That
hence means an increase of 25% compared to the last limit of $300 mil-
lion which was established in 2003.503
In July 2013, NRC adapted the amounts to inflation.504 As of Sept-
ember 10, 2013, the following amounts apply: $375,000,000 in the first
494 For a detailed discussion, see, e.g., LIU, supra note 201, at 296303.
495 See, e.g., De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 653; Haake & Marsh,
supra note 50, at 56.
496 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 57677 (1957).
497 The Price-Anderson Act has been revised in 1967, 1975, 1988, and 2005.
498 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 56777 (1957).
499 See Faure & Van den Bergh, supra note 415, at 244.
500 See id. at 253.
501 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 350, at 243.
502 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4); Increase in the Primary Nuclear Liability Insurance Premium,
75 Fed. Reg. 16646 (Apr. 2, 2010).
503 See generally AM. NUCLEAR INS., http://www.nuclearinsurance.com [https://perma.cc
/KK9B-FVXV] (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
504 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4); Increase in the Primary Nuclear Liability Insurance Premium,
75 Fed. Reg. 16646 (Apr. 2, 2010).
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tier and in the second (collective) tier $121,255,000 per reactor per acci-
dent, plus 5% for legal expenses.505 Thus, since that date the total amount
of compensation available in the United States is $13,616,046,000
[$375,000,000 + (104 * ($121,255,000 + $6,062,750))], with a maximum
contribution of $18,963,000 per reactor per calender year.
If a catastrophic accident happens, which needs the collection of
retrospective premiums through years, the victims do not need to wait
until the operators have paid all the premiums. The NRC guarantees
those retrospective premiums, or, in other words advances the compensa-
tion in the second tier and later collects this from the operators.506
The premium under the second layer of the Price-Anderson Act
is financed through a so-called retrospective premium scheme.507 Hence,
premiums do not have to be paid ex ante, but only ex post after the
nuclear accident materializes.508 This retrospective premium scheme was
introduced in 1975.509 Initially, the financial requirement was satisfied
with the coverage from private insurance and a government indemnity
agreement.510 This was because the nuclear industry was not thought to
be capable to bear all the burdens at its infancy period, and the Price-
Anderson Act intended to encourage the development of the nuclear
industry.511 However, after years of development, it was believed that the
industry should take its responsibilities.512 This was achieved by phasing
out federal indemnity and establishing a system of retrospective premi-
ums paid by nuclear operators.513
Under the retrospective premiums scheme, if an accident leads to
the damage in excess of $375 million, all qualified nuclear operators are
obliged to pay the retrospective premiums up to $121.255 million.514 This
arrangement is a form of a risk-sharing agreement. However, different
from the usual understanding about risk-sharing agreements, this arrange-
ment is a mandatory system. It is effectively imposed by statute.515 Rather
than the voluntary pooling of operators, the retrospective premiums
505 Id.
506 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 350, at 260.
507 Id. at 243.
508 Id.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 252.
511 Id. at 24243.
512 H.R. Rep. No. 94-648, at 10 (1975).
513 Id.
514 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 57677 (1957).
515 Id.
454 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 40:387
scheme is established according to the legislative requirement of the
amended Price-Anderson Act.516 This arrangement ensures that all nu-
clear power plant operators participate in the system and provide strong
capacity. Besides, this system is used only when the primary instru-
mentthe insurance marketfails to cover the full damage. In other
words, the retrospective premiums scheme provides an upper layer of
compensation for victims.
In a simple scheme the compensation regime under the Price-
Anderson Act could hence be sketched as follows:
TABLE 2. COMPENSATION UNDER THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT SINCE 2013
Operators liability $375 million
Retrospective premiums $121.255 million/operator
Total compensation $13.6 billion517
3. Risk-Sharing for CCS?
Just looking at the problems that emerge with the insurance of
CCS-related risk and the theory and practice with risk-sharing agree-
ments, it is not difficult to argue that a risk-sharing agreement may be
an attractive solution to cover CCS-related risks more particularly where
traditional insurance markets may fail. A risk-sharing agreement does
not necessarily require ex ante actuarial information which would be
necessary if premiums are asked (like in an insurance model). Moreover,
ex ante premiums may not necessarily have to be paid as a result of
which risk-sharing does not create liquidity problems. An optimal risk
pooling mechanism would also create strong incentives for mutual
monitoring and could hence contribute to sharing of information on this
new and technically complicated risk, thus raising safety levels of all
operators in the sector. In that sense, a risk-sharing agreement could
even increase general safety. However, the experience with the nuclear
516 See Faure, supra note 415, at 252.
517 This amount consists of the $375 million of the operators liability + 104 (the total
amount of operators in the United States) multiplied with their contribution to the
second tier of $121,255,000 + 5% for legal expenses. The correct total amount since 2013
is therefore $13,616,046,000. The maximum contribution per reactor per calendar year
to the second tier since 2013 is $18,963,000.
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sector shows that an important condition for a risk-sharing agreement
to work is that risks are relatively comparable.518 Moreover, mandatory
safety regulation can, to an important extent, facilitate risk-sharing,
thus reducing the need for mutual monitoring. The voluntary creation of
a risk-sharing agreement is, moreover, more likely in a regime of manda-
tory financial security.519
The CCS-related literature is therefore not surprisingly enthusi-
astic concerning the potential of risk-sharing agreements.520 Many refer
to the example of the Price-Anderson Act we discussed521 and also at the
policy level, there is some interest in risk-sharing agreements.522 In sum,
if particular conditions are met, a risk-sharing agreement between
operators may be a valuable instrument to cover CCS-related risks.
C. Guarantees, Deposits, and Bonds
1. Theory
Obviously many parties could provide a financial guarantee to the
operator.523 Such a financial guarantee could be provided by a mother
company or another third party that would presumably have a stronger
financial capacity than the operator. It could also be provided by a fi-
nancial institution such as a bank. In particular cases the guarantee
could take the form of a letter of credit.
All of those guarantees have a simple theoretical basis: a pre-
sumably stronger third party (either a corporate entity or a financial in-
stitution) basically puts its balance sheet at risk by guaranteeing that it
will cover the liabilities of the operator in case a particular risk would
materialize.524
For the policymaker or regulator, the advantage may be that a
stronger guarantee is provided than when only the operators assets were
at stake. Operators themselves would presumably use these types of
518 See Faure, supra note 415, at 282.
519 See infra Part VII.A.
520 See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 7, 36.
521 See, e.g., De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 653; Havercroft & Macrory,
supra note 112, at 7; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 18.
522 However, Guidance Document 4 in Article 19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial
Mechanisms of the European Commission are remarkably silent on the potential of risk-
sharing agreements.
523 See Faure, supra note 415, at 252.
524 Id. at 253, 271.
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guarantees when regulatory authorities find it necessary (and hence hold
that merely relying on self-insurance is not sufficient). However, in par-
ticular cases, the costs of those guarantees can be quite high.525 If it
would be a guarantee by a related corporate entity, then that should not
necessarily be the case; but it may be different if guarantees would have to
be provided by a bank. Compared to insurance, one can hold that if insurers
specialize in CCS-related risks, they may have more information for an
appropriate risk differentiation and premium setting as a result of which
the costs of insurance could be lower than the costs of a bank guarantee.
An alternative is to require the operator to provide ex ante a
deposit into a guarantee account.526 The idea would be that a direct guar-
antee is provided by depositing a sum of money corresponding to the
potential damage in order to cover future losses that could result from
the CCS-related activity. Trust funds, stand-by trust funds, and escrow
accounts are also comparable instruments.527 In all those cases (although
there are differences), money is set aside to serve for a specific purpose
in the future.
Yet another alternative is to use the capital market and more
particularly bonds, whereby the interest rate on the bond reflects the
accident rate.528 Investors have hence the opportunity to buy a bond cre-
ating a warrant in favor of the operator of their choice.529 If, for example,
during the period of the bond (say one year) no accident happened, the
amount of the guarantee provided by the bond would be paid with interest.
If, however, the risk materialized, the bond posted would be used to cover
the damage.530
2. Evaluation
The enthusiasm in the sector for the just mentioned deposits will
logically be relatively small. The obvious reason is that it leads to an
immediate immobilization of capital for losses that may not even materi-
alize in the future. It hence leads to a large liquidity problem. If the
525 Id. at 260.
526 Id. at 252.
527 Id.
528 Id.
529 See Faure, supra note 415, at 252.
530 For an explanation of the working of these cat bonds, see Jean-Robert Tyran & Peter
Zweifel, Environmental Risk Internalization through Capital Markets (ERICAM): The
Case of Nuclear Power, 13 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 43144 (1993).
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deposit should, moreover, be large enough to cover all potential losses,
it would be substantial and could hence create liquidity problems for the
operators involved and may for that reason not be very popular. Also, bank
guarantees may not be a new attractive alternative. The reason is that
they are often considered relatively expensive, compared to insurance.531
Corporate guarantees can, in some cases, be used. The problem is, how-
ever, that they do not always provide a good protection from potential
claims of the operators creditors.532 A guarantee would only provide secu-
rity to victims if a third party (guarantor) would directly accept obligations
towards the authorities or potential victims to compensate in case of
harm.533 Whereas this may be a scenario that could be used to guarantee
compliance with obligations to clean up polluted sites, given that damage
resulting from CCS can have a widely varying character, it is not likely
that those type of guarantees would be provided specifically for CCS-
related risks.
Guarantees and deposits are discussed in the CCS-related litera-
ture, but apparently not with great enthusiasm.534 The deposit is appar-
ently only used as a guarantee in Germany where a draft CCS Act of
2009 mentioned that an operator must deposit with the competent
authority the equivalent of 3% of the emissions trading allowances which
the storage saves each year.535 However, this may obviously only provide
a security for the climate-related risks (the risk of future emissions) but
not for other types of damage that could result from CCS. In the EU
Guidance Document 4, the corporate guarantee and escrow accounts are
not considered reliable financial securities since they may all be subject
to claims of creditors.536 The EU Guidance Document 4 is more enthusi-
astic concerning a deposit which has the advantage that if the money is
deposited to the competent authority, it is no longer subject to claims of
creditors of the operator; the disadvantage is obviously the high cost of
531 Moreover, they are held not to provide additional security for the competent authority.
See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 49.
532 Aproblem is that a guarantee provided, e.g., bya related company, is usuallynotspecified
for a particular goal and will therefore generally support the activities of an affiliated
company. However, when that company runs into insolvency, the guarantee will be used
to deal with all claims of the mass of creditors. There is hence no guarantee that the
proceeds would only be used to satisfy the claims of victims of CCS-related damage. In
concurrence with the other creditors, victims may not be able to enforce their claims.
533 See Bergkamp, Herbatchek & Jayanti, supra note 472, at 127.
534 See, e.g., De Figueiredo, Reiner & Herzog, supra note 133, at 653.
535 See IEA, supra note 213, at 30.
536 See Guidance Document 4, supra note 447, at 2627.
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a deposit.537 Another disadvantage of a deposit is that substantial amounts
of capital would have to be immobilized for a potentially longer period of
time. That capital can hence not be used for other societal valuable activ-
ities, whereas the likelihood that it should ever be used to satisfy claims
of victims may be small.
The EPA Guidance Document equally discusses guarantees and
deposits under different headings. Corporate guarantees can be used
within the framework of self-insurance. A corporate guarantee can be
used if it is owned by a parent corporation to benefit a corporate subsid-
iary in which it owns at least 50% of the subsidiaries voting stock and
has been in business for at least five years.538 With corporate guarantees,
the relative financial risk to the government is, however, considered to
be high.539 Trust funds are considered useful for activities that are
relatively certain in terms of occurrence and costs, such as post-injection
site care and site closure demonstration but not for activities of uncertain
frequency and costs.540 The relative financial risk to the government may
be low, but the costs of a trust fund can be high.541
The instrument that is mostly mentioned for covering CCS-re-
lated risks and that is based on the capital markets, is bonding.542 A
problem with any use of capital markets, including bonding, is that most
of the so-called catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds) are always used for
catastrophes which are essentially sudden events.543 CAT bonds usually
have a short period of cover within which either the catastrophe happens
(and hence the bond is lost) or nothing happens (and the profit on the
bond is made).544 CAT bonds are, however, typically not used for long-
term risks.545 That is why the CCS-related literature mentions that
537 See id. It is remarkable that the Guidance Document 4 considers the bank guarantee
or the irrevocable standby letter of credit as providing excellent certainty and having low
costs (at least for credit worthy parties).
538 For the further conditions, see GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATIONOFCARBON DIOXIDE, supra
note 454, at 17.
539 Id. at 45.
540 Id. at 21.
541 The EPA Guidance Document equally contains recommendedspecifications concerning
inter alia the wording of the trust documents. Id. at 2627.
542 See Wilson, Klass & Bergan, supra note 72, at 4580. For a further detailed analysis
of the feasibility of bonding schemes for geological storage, see generally Gerard & Wilson,
supra note 314.
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bonding is problematic given the potentially long-tail character of the
CCS-related liability risks.546 For that reason, it may not be an appropri-
ate instrument to cover CCS-related risks.547 Bonding could therefore at
best be used during the operation/injection period, but not for liability
during the post-closure monitoring.548
The surety bond is discussed in the EPA Financial Responsibility
Document as a guarantee related either to a specific performance or a
financial guarantee.549 However, the document also recognizes that a
bond may not be useful to cover long-term liabilities and would therefore
not be available for post-injection site care and site closure.550
D. Summary
This overview of alternative compensation mechanisms shows
that there are particular instruments that each have their strengths and
weaknesses.551 That may well be an important argument not to necessar-
ily express a preference for the use of one exclusive instrument, but
rather to look for which combination of particular instruments could be
indicated as financial security for which particular operator and for
which specific phase in the project life cycle of CCS.552
For example, as far as the phase of operation and injection is con-
cerned for larger operators, self-insurance (or eventually even captives)
may well work. For smaller operators, self-insurance could be used for a
first layer (as a kind of retention), depending upon their balance sheet.
In both cases, in a regulatory environment where financial security would
be demanded, regulatory authorities of course need to carefully verify the
adequacy of the self-insurance that has been offered and, moreover, it
546 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 162 (arguing that [b]onding works well for short
timeframes, but over the fifteen to thirty years required for post-closure financial
responsibility, bonding could tie up capital and prove less efficient than insurance-based
instruments.); see also Gerard & Wilson, supra note 314, at 1100.
547 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 162; see also Gerard & Wilson, supra note 314,
at 1100.
548 It is, moreover, considered to be relatively costly. See Havercroft & Macrory, supra
note 112, at 47.
549 GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454, at 1112.
550 Id. at 18, 2122.
551 See generally Guidance Document 4, supra note 447; GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF
CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454.
552 For that reason, the EPA Financial Responsibility Document explicitly recommends the
use of multiple instruments rather than a single instrument to meet financial responsi-
bility. See GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454, at 3839.
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should equally be guaranteed that the self-insurance remains available
as long as the risks can materialize.
In the phase of operation and injection, insurance or self-insurance
may play a role. Eventually, guarantees could be used as well, although
important conditions would have to be met to verify the viability of the
guarantee. The same would be true for bonding. There may not be much
enthusiasm on the capital market for these types of bonds.
As far as the second phase of post-closure monitoring is con-
cerned, the alternatives already become more limited. Given the also
potential long-tail character of post-closure monitoring, insurance may
not be an option here. Self-insurance may play a role, but the difficulty
is that the post-closure monitoring requirement may also extend over
many years. This hence requires a regulatory agency (under the assump-
tion there would be a mandatory financial security) to monitor the ade-
quacy of the provided self-insurance also on a regular basis. However,
the option of self-insurance should not be ruled out since it remains a
low-cost option for operators. Provided specific conditions (as far as the
reliability of the offered balance sheet protection is concerned) are met,
this may be an adequate instrument.
Bonding may not be viable for post-closure monitoring given the
long-tail character (whereas bonds are typically suited for short-term
risks). The most appropriate instrument to deal with financial security
for post-closure monitoring is probably a risk-sharing agreement between
operators. Provided specific regulatory conditions are met (minimum
safety standards) and a reasonable comparability of the risk, the advan-
tage would be that this could be a low-cost alternative for operators. It
would also provide incentives for mutual monitoring and thus contribute
to improved safety and investments in technological innovation.
As far as the phase of long-term stewardship is concerned, we
have ruled out liability for this long-term risk,553 as a result of which for
that phase alternative compensation mechanisms would not be needed
from the operator. That may, however, require a role of the government
in facilitating compensation.
VII. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FACILITATING COMPENSATION
At various instances, it has already been stressed that there may
be an important role for government in facilitating compensation for
553 See supra Part IV.G.
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CCS-related risks. However, one has to be careful: such a facilitation
does not necessarily mean that government would have to pay the com-
pensation. That could, as the literature has rightly mentioned, amount
to an undue subsidization of CCS operators and create a moral hazard
risk.554 However, we will argue that government can play an important
role in facilitating financial security and, depending upon the various
phases in the CCS project life cycle, this facilitative role could take dif-
ferent forms. An important role of government is obviously to organize
facilitative strategies to stimulate insurability.555 In this respect, we for
example argued above that an important task of government would be
to create an appropriate regulatory framework providing minimum safety
standards for CCS. Such a regulatory framework could stimulate risk
differentiation and control of moral hazard by insurers556 but also the
creation of risk-sharing agreements between operators.557 Depending on
the various phases of the CCS project life cycle, and more particularly as
far as long-term stewardship is concerned, there may be an argument for
government intervention, not only in a facilitative role, but even in taking
over liability from operators. This then specifically concerns the phase of
long-term stewardship. In that respect, one should recall that the inter-
vention of government to provide relief would certainly not be limited to
the case of CCS. Governments intervene, sometimes on the basis of inter-
national conventions558 and in other cases on the basis of national law,559
in a more or less generous manner. Also, in the literature concerning CCS-
related risks, government compensation programs, such as the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the United States, are called upon
as one of the potential solutions to financing CCS-related risks.560 Hence,
in addressing the role of government in facilitating compensation, some
comparison with a similar role of government in providing relief for vic-
tims of catastrophes can be instructive.
554 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 2 (arguing that no financial risk manage-
ment frameworkshould inappropriatelysubsidize or otherwise provide economicadvantage
for CCS over future, as yet undeveloped or improved, technologies designed to make coal
a cleaner source of power).
555 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 25 (arguing that the
aim of a liability framework should be to create the market conditions in which private
insurance products can be offered in the CCS market.).
556 See supra Part VI.C.
557 See supra Part VI.B.
558 Such as in the case of the international conventions for nuclear liability.
559 For example, this occurred in the United States via the September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund. For details, see generally Bruggeman, Faure & Fiori, supra note 380.
560 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 1819.
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First, a simple but effective facilitative strategy will be discussed,
being the provision of compulsory financial security via regulation (A).
Next, the question will be asked to what extent direct compensation by
government should be provided for particular phases in the CCS project
life cycle (B). In some cases (for example as far as terrorism-related risks
are concerned), government takes up a role as reinsurer of last resort,
more particularly when, given limited supply, a large capacity could not
be generated. The question arises whether such a rule should also be
allocated to government in the case of CCS-related risks (C).
A. Compulsory Financial Guarantees?
1. Theory
In law and economics research several criteria have been advanced
to analyze where mandatory financial security may be indicated. The
most important reason for introducing compulsory insurance is insol-
vency. Insolvency may pose a problem of underdeterrence. If the expected
damage largely exceeds the injurers assets, the injurer will only have
incentives to purchase insurance up to the amount of his own assets.561
He is only exposed to the risk of losing his own assets in a liability suit.562
The judgment proof problem may therefore lead to underinsurance and
thus to underdeterrence.563 Jost has rightly pointed out that, in these
circumstances of insolvency, compulsory insurance might provide an op-
timal outcome.564 By introducing a duty to purchase insurance coverage
for the amount of the expected loss, better results will be obtained than
with insolvency whereby the magnitude of the loss exceeds the injurers
assets.565 However, the literature has equally formulated a few conditions
561 See generally Peter J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance,
16 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996).
562 Id.
563 Id.
564 See id. A similar argument has been formulated by Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory
Insurance and the Judgment-proof Problem, 18 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1998) and by
Göran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, II, CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). Skogh has also pointed out that compulsory insurance may
save on transaction costs.
565 See Howard C. Kunreuther & Paul K. Freeman, Insurability, Environmental Risks
and the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 30416 (Anthony Heyes
ed., 2001).
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and warnings when introducing compulsory financial security.566 One
warning is that the moral hazard problem should of course be controlled.
If moral hazard cannot be controlled, the regulator should even consider
a prohibition of liability insurance.567
Second, if one were only to introduce compulsory insurance (as
compared to mandatory financial security, which is obviously broader)
this should only be done when no restrictions on the insurance market
exist. If high concentration would exist, premiums would be too high and
this could equally reduce the incentives of insurers to control the moral
hazard risk.
Third, from a policy perspective, it may not be wise to limit the
duty to provide financial security to insurance. If the policymaker were
to introduce compulsory insurance, it would become totally dependent on
insurance to fulfill the duty to insure. This could create an undesirable
situation whereby insurers would become de facto licensors of the indus-
try, which could be problematic from a policy perspective.568 Insurers
under compulsory insurance de facto become surrogate regulators which
at least has the advantage that it provides them strong arguments for
effective risk management.569 That may hence be a strong argument to-
wards a flexible approach, i.e., not to limit the provision of mandatory
security necessarily to insurance, but to allow the market itself to sug-
gest a wide variety of financial and insurance instruments, as long as
they can guarantee compensation when the accident happens.
2. For CCS?
To a large extent, some of the arguments in favor of mandatory
financial security may apply to CCS-related risks as well.570 Especially
where smaller and medium-sized operators may also be involved in CCS,
they could create a risk of major damage of which the magnitude could
go beyond their personal assets.571 In that case an insolvency risk would
566 For a summary of those warnings, see generally Michael G. Faure, Economic Criteria for
Compulsory Insurance, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ONRISK &INS.149 (2006); see also RICHARDSON,
supra note 202, at 36066.
567 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 4558 (1986).
568 See Alberto Monti, Environmental Risk: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach
to Liability and Insurance, 9 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 51, 5179 (2001).
569 RICHARDSON, supra note 202, at 36263.
570 For other arguments in favor of mandatory insurance, see Dana & Wiseman, supra
note 444, at 154671.
571 See generally Faure, supra note 566.
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merge and hence a danger of externalization of the damage.572 Also in the
CCS-related literature, some arguments are made in favor of compulsory
financial guarantees, more particularly by Trabucchi and Patton.573 How-
ever, the warnings we formulated above may apply to the case of CCS as
well. As mentioned, it may be dangerous to mandate financial security
when it is not certain that the market can deliver the required financial
security.574 This therefore calls for caution, especially when concerning
new risks such as CCS. One way of dealing with this cautious approach
is to allow sufficient flexibility as far as the form of financial security is
concerned and hence not to limit this necessarily to insurance. An impor-
tant condition would only be that the regulator would accurately verify
whether the form and amount of the financial security offered by the
operator would be adequate to cover the potential damage emerging from
the CCS operation.
When referring to the possibility of introducing mandatory finan-
cial security for CCS, one should once more differentiate between the
various phases of the CCS life cycle. Recall that, as has been mentioned
above, insurance may be available during the first phase of CO2 injection,
but may already become more problematic during the second phase of
post-closure monitoring and may not be available at all during the final
phase of long-term stewardship. However, the mere fact that insurance
is, for example during the phase of post-closure monitoring, difficult to
obtain, should not be an argument against imposing compulsory finan-
cial security. The key issue is that compulsory financial security should
not automatically be equated with insurance. As we have discussed in
detail, operators should be provided a freedom to make use of alternative
compensation mechanisms. It does indeed not make sense to force large
and well-capitalized operators to take out insurance which would not
substantially improve their financial situation and only lead to the costs
of paying premiums. In those situations, alternatives like a controlled
self-regulation575 could be preferred.
One way of approaching this issue is shown in the European Union
where a Guidance Document has been issued describing the possible
financial security and financial mechanisms that could be used to cover
572 Id.
573 Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 14 (arguing in favor of the mandatory purchase
of third-party instruments or self-insurance), 16 (demanding evidence of financial re-
sponsibility for the operating life of the facility).
574 See generally Jost, supra note 561.
575 See, e.g., Guidance Document 4, supra note 447.
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CCS-related risks.576 The advantage of such a guidance note is that it
provides information to licensing authorities on the type of financial
security that could be accepted when offered by CCS operators. Such an
approach with a guidance note has the advantage of allowing sufficient
flexibility and avoiding unnecessary costs (e.g., forcing also major energy
companies that would be engaged in CCS to transfer risks to an insur-
ance company). The model followed in the EU seems to allow for suffi-
cient flexibility by, on the one hand, mandating financial security but, on
the other hand, leaving flexibility to local regulators to determine the
amount and form of financial securityalso taking into account the
specific risks posed by the particular site and the specific features of the
operator involved. That may hence be a model for other jurisdictions as
well.577 As was already mentioned, a similar model is basically followed
in the United States as well: owners or operators of geological sequestra-
tion wells must demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility for
performing corrective actions on wells in the area of review, injection
well plugging, post-injection site care and site closure, and emergency
and remedial response.578 The way in which operators and owners can
demonstrate financial responsibility has been worked out in the EPA
Guidance Document on UIC.579 The approach followed in the United
States is hence similar to the approach followed in Europe by providing
guidance on the type of instruments that could be considered as a suffi-
cient demonstration of financial responsibility which will be reviewed by
the UIC director.580 The EPA Guidance Document also has a similar type
of flexibility as far as the meeting of the specified financial test criteria
is concerned. The document does list particular qualifying instruments,
but this list is not considered to be exhaustive or absolute as a result of
576 Id.
577 See generally id. The EU Guidance Document 4 on the implementation of Directive
2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide follows from Article 7(10) of the
CCS Directive, which states that applications for storage permits must include proof that
the financial security or other equivalent provision as required under Article 19 of the
Directive will be valid and effective before commencement of the injection. This hence
amounts to a financial security requirement as defined in Article 19 of the Directive,
which holds that Member States shall ensure the proof that adequate provisions can be
established, by way of financial security or any other equivalent, on the basis of arrange-
ments to be decided by the Member States, is presented by the potential operator as part
of the application for a storage permit.
578 See GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE, supra note 454.
579 Id.
580 See id. at 67 (on the owner or operator submission requirements and the director
review responsibilities).
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which owners or operators may also use other financial instruments if
the UIC program director finds them satisfactory.581
B. Direct Compensation by the Government?
1. Theory
A second way in which government could play a role in facilitating
compensation for CCS-related damage is to provide outright compensa-
tion to the victims. In that case, the role of government would not (as
when it mandates financial security) be merely facilitative, but govern-
ment would intervene directly to compensate the damage itself.582 These
type of government-based compensation models are well-known from the
experiences with the ex post compensation by government of victims of
(natural) disasters.583 Usually this involves ex post relief through lump
sum payments to victims that are financed by the general tax payers.584
However, damage resulting from CCS has to be clearly qualified
as a technological or manmade disaster.585 In that case the primary in-
strument to be used should be liability law. An exposure of the potential
operator to liability is, as we have repeatedly argued above,586 necessary
in order to expose the CCS operator to the social costs of its activity.
Compensation by the government would from that perspective lead to an
externalization of the risk to society (more particularly the tax payer)
and would thus create a moral hazard on the side of operators.
2. For CCS?
From that perspective one can understand that much of the CCS-
related literature is strongly against any type of financial intervention
581 Id. at 9.
582 See generally Veronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against
Catastrophe: Government Simulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 185, 19092 (2012).
583 See generally id. There are many examples of ex post compensation by government to
victims of catastrophes. It can take the form of either a structural fund solution (e.g., in
Austria or Belgium) or ad hoc relief (such as the well-known September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund in the United States).
584 Precisely this redistributional character of compensation via government is debated
since disaster expenditures (e.g., by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the
United States) are often politically motivated. See Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel,
The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 496509 (2003).
585 See, e.g., id.
586 See supra Parts III.A, IV.A.
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by government, arguing that this would amount to an undesirable sub-
sidy of CCS.587 A transfer of risk to the public (i.e., the tax payers) would
proffer a competitive disadvantage to environmentally superior opera-
tions;588 public financing is therefore considered to distort or eliminate
the impact of market forces.589 A transfer of liability to the state could
amount to an undesirable subsidy,590 and therefore most of the CCS-
related literature has argued that limiting liability of CCS operators (and
thus transferring the risk to the state) would be undesirable.591 In that
respect, it could also be argued that government-provided compensation
would violate the principles of fair and efficient compensation discussed
above,592 arguing that the duty to contribute financially should in princi-
ple be related to the amount in which a specific activity or entrepreneur
contributed to the risk.593
The question of where government should financially intervene
is unavoidably linked with the question of whether the liability of the CCS
operator should be limited, and that again depends on the question of what
precise goals have to be fulfilled with a liability regime. Above, we have
argued that there is no reason to put a financial limit (a so-called cap) on
the liability of the operator.594 However, it has equally been argued that
there are reasons to limit the liability of CCS operators in time. The
simple economic reason is, as especially strongly argued by Adelman and
Duncan,595 that long-term liability will be discounted to todays present
value and can therefore not have any deterrent effect whatsoever. From
that perspective it was argued that a transfer of liability for the long-term
stewardship from the operator to the state can be defended on economic
grounds.596 However, some current regulations have so-called claw-back
provisions, allowing the state to recover costs from the operator when
they are later discovered to have been at fault.597
The positive arguments in favor of transferring liability for long-
term stewardship to the state seem convincing. It can make optimal use
587 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 7, 14.
588 See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 11.
589 See id. at 14.
590 See MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 7, 14.
591 See cf. Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 108.
592 See supra Part V.
593 Id.
594 See supra Part IV.H.
595 See Adelman & Duncan, supra note 11.
596 See supra Part IV.G.
597 See Havercroft & Macrory, supra note 112, at 6.
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of the capacity of government to distribute risks over time and even over
future generations.598 Moreover, operators would even for the long-term
stewardship not completely be off the hook since an advance payment
could still be required for the costs of monitoring during the long-term
stewardship.599 However, that means that once these costs are paid, lia-
bility of the operator ends and is shifted to the government.600 Monitoring
costs are of course substantially lower than the total potential damage
which keeps liability exposure of operators within reasonable limits (in
time). In addition to the argument that liability for long-term risk would
not generate positive incentive effects, one can also point once more at
the positive externalities that can be generated by CCS technology. As
many have stressed, the most important barrier to successfully develop-
ing CCS is precisely the potential liability for long-term stewardship.601
Finally, it should be mentioned that society has (at the interna-
tional level but also in legislation of national legal systems) often pro-
vided subsidies for starting industries.602 For example, the goal of the
nuclear liability conventions as they emerged in the 1960s was clearly to
protect nuclear operators from potentially broad liability.603 In that
particular case of the nuclear liability conventions there were, moreover,
financial limits on the liability of power plant operators which is not at
all what is proposed in this particular case.604 Government intervention
would only apply to the phase of long-term stewardship which is hence
much more limited than in the case of the nuclear liability conventions.
598 Government intervention in this case thus creates a form of cross-time diversification,
which the private market could not achieve. See Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-
Kerjan, Challenges for Terrorism Risk Insurance in the United States, 18 J.ECON. PERSP.
201, 210 (2004).
599 Liability, GLOB. CCS INST., http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/carbon
-dioxide-capture-and-storage-and-unfccc-recommendations-addressing-technical-18
[http://perma.cc/LRH3-N63K] (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
600 Id.
601 See, e.g., Hawkins, et al., supra note 2, at 4405 (suggesting that [t]he lack of a regu-
latory frameworkspecifically forCCSincreases uncertainty andcomplicates project uptake.
Alongside unfavourable economics, it is the most often quoted barrier that stands in the
way of CCS deployment.); see also Trabucchi, Donlan & Wade, supra note 38, at 388
(stating [h]owever, because it represents a new and relatively unproven technology,
concern about potential liability associated with CCS often is citedas a significant barrier
to project deployment.).
602 Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governments in Compensation for Nuclear Damage: 20
Years after Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 261
311 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 2007).
603 Id.
604 Id.
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C. Reinsurer of Last Resort
1. Theory
In various legal systems an interesting model has been developed
whereby the government acts as reinsurer of last resort.605 Under this
approach of government involvement, the State takes at least part of the
risk for losses from catastrophes.606 Even though government interven-
tion is required (since the private insurance market cannot provide ade-
quate catastrophe insurance coverage), the underlying philosophy of this
approach is that private insurance should keep on playing a significant
role in allocating compensation for victims of catastrophes.607 This option
then usually takes the form of a multi-layered insurance program.608 Such
a program is normally administered by private insurance companies,
meaning that they sell insurance, collect premiums, and pay claims.609
There can indeed be arguments to favor such a reinsurance by
government, assuming that capacity on the private insurance market is
indeed severely falling behind. It can be held that without state interven-
tion, insurance coverage for disasters would simply not have developed.610
Reinsurance by the State can then be considered as an adequate method
to resolve the uninsurability problem.611 A condition is, of course, that the
government charges an actuarially fair premium for its intervention.612
This type of government intervention has, moreover, the advantage that
ex post relief sponsored through the public purse can be avoided.613





610 See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy, 23 REG. 40 (2000); Howard
C. Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance, 12 J.RISK &UNCERTAINTY
171, 18083 (1996); see also Reimund Schwarze & Gerhard Wagner, In the Aftermath of
Dresden: New Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
154 (2004).
611 These public-private initiatives to cover extreme risks are also supported by OECD
recommendations. See Alberto Monti, Public-private Initiatives to Cover Extreme Events,
in EXTREME EVENTS AND INSURANCE:2011ANNUS HORRIBILIS 2738 (Christophe Courbage
& Walter R. Stahel eds., 2012).
612 Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POLY 339, 358 (2007).
613 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996); see also Howard C. Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules
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2. For CCS?
There is not a lot of discussion on the role of government as rein-
surer of last resort in the CCS-related literature. We mentioned that some
authors refer to the NFIP in the United States as an example for CCS,614
and Makuch et al. refer to public-private liability funds for CCS.615 To
some extent the intervention of government as reinsurer of last resort is
also considered as a public-private partnership.616 There seems yet not
to be sufficient information available to evoke that this type of interven-
tion wouldin this stage of the development of CCS technology and the
knowledge about the risks and potential damagebe necessary. Indeed,
such an intervention of government as reinsurer of last resort typically
happens for catastrophic risks where it is argued that the traditional com-
mercial (re)insurance market cannot provide sufficient capacity to cover
the risks.617 Government then steps in to provide additional supply.618
Although we have indicated above that there may indeed also be poten-
tial capacity problems in the provision of insurance,619 we have equally
argued that a variety of alternative compensation mechanisms could be
developed as well such as a risk-sharing agreement between operators.620
Hence, it seems that at this stage calling for a role for government as rein-
surer of last resort simply comes too early, since it may be that market
solutions (such as risk-sharing agreements) can still be developed.
The literature has indicated that such an intervention by govern-
ment should be non-distortive in the sense that the government should
only intervene when market solutions are not available.621 Moreover,
government intervention should always have a temporary character in
order to stimulate the development of market solutions.622 In this stage
of the development of the CCS technology, it is not yet known whether
there would be a problem with the supply of sufficient capacity. Hence it
seems that at this moment it is too early to plead in favor of a role for
rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101,
113 (2006) (arguing that this governments role in assisting the supply side allows avoid-
ing the inefficiencies and inequities associated with disaster assistance).
614 See, e.g., Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 1819.
615 MAKUCH, GEORGIEVA & ORAEE-MIRZAMANI, supra note 28, at 24.
616 See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 582.
617 Id.
618 Id.
619 See supra Part VI.B.
620 See supra Part VII.B.
621 See Bruggeman, Faure & Fiori, supra note 380.
622 See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 582, at 223.
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government as reinsurer of last resort for CCS-related risks. Only when it
would appear that those capacity problems would be real and that gov-
ernment should hence step in to supply coverage could thisbe considered.623
VIII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Because conclusions or summaries have been provided at the end
of most sections, we can be relatively short at this point because the
policy recommendations follow logically from the points discussed in the
various sections. The crucial question is obviously at this stage what
policymakers could do to stimulate solutions especially for the long-term
CCS liability. Starting point for the recommendations is that a liability
and compensation regime should provide incentives to stakeholders to
prevent the harm to the extent that their incentives for prevention could
be affected (and hence a moral hazard could arise). At the same time, the
question arises how an effective liability and compensation scheme can
be structured in order to stimulate insurability or to stimulate the
creation of alternative compensation mechanisms.
Recommendations can be made concerning the precise design of
an effective liability mechanism (A), as well as a compensation scheme
(B), at the same time asking the question whether there is a particular
role for the government (C).
A. Efficient Liability Rules
Efficient liability rules in order to provide incentives to stake-
holders to prevent harm and to stimulate insurability can be structured
according to the following principles:
 Given the potentially hazardous character of CCS,
operators should be strictly liable for damage re-
sulting from CCS.
 Compliance with regulatory standards should not
automatically free an operator from liability.
 The risk of causal uncertainty should not be shifted
to the operator; rather a proportional liability rule
should be applied to deal with causal uncertainty.
623 But also then particular conditions for an effective intervention should be respected.
For details, see Bruggeman, Faure & Fiori, supra note 380; see also Bruggeman, Faure
& Heldt, supra note 582, at 22123.
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 Policymakers should be cautious with the introduc-
tion of joint and several liability regimes as that
could increase the potential scope of liability for
CCS operators and could endanger the insurability
of the liability.
 Operators should no longer be held liable if, after
post-closure monitoring, the site has been properly
transferred to the government.
 Liability should in principle be unlimited in amount.
The policymaker should hence not introduce finan-
cial caps on the liability of the operator.
B. Compensation
Different types of compensation mechanisms can be used for differ-
ent phases of the CCS project life cycle, potentially also in combination.624
1. Operation and Injection
 For large operators self-insurance should be al-
lowed, provided that the regulator regularly veri-
fies the adequacy of the self-insurance provided.
 For smaller operators self-insurance can still be
used during the operation as a first layer (reten-
tion) in addition to other instruments.
 Other instruments that can play a role in providing
compensation in this phase are insurance, poten-
tially bonding (although in a more limited role),
and guarantees.
2. Post-Closure Monitoring
 Given the long-term character of post-closure mon-
itoring insurance will usually not be available to
cover potential damage in this phase.
 Self-insurance can still be used, just as during the
operation and injection phase.
624 This hence pleads in favor of a multi-layered approach to the liability for CCS-related
damage. See Fred Eames & Scott Anderson, The Layered Approach to Liability for Geo-
logic Sequestration of CO2, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 1065355 (2013).
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 Bonding may not be useful since bonds are typically
used for short-term risks, not for risks with a long-
term character.
 A risk-sharing agreement concluded between op-
erators on a voluntary basis could provide compen-
sation.
3. Long-Term Stewardship
 Operators only provide an advancement for monitor-
ing costs that have to be objectively determined on
the basis of expert evidence.
 Potential damage during this phase will be directly
financed by the government.
 If desirable, the compensation in that phase could
be financed via a system of retrospective premiums
(like in the Price-Anderson Act).
C. The Government
Also government can take different measures, in addition to de-
signing an optimal liability regime, to which we already referred, in order
to stimulate an optimal compensation for CCS-related risks:
 The government should introduce tailored and de-
tailed safety regulation for the prevention of CCS-
related risks.
 Regulation should be proactive and dynamic.
 In order to create risk-sharing agreements at re-
gional level (e.g., EU, Asean, Mercosur), safety stan-
dards could be harmonised in order to stimulate
larger networks of operators willing to engage in
risk-sharing agreements.
 The provision of financial security by operators
should be made mandatory. However, the precise
amount and type of financial security can be decided
by local licensing authorities, taking into account
location specific circumstances of the particular
CCS site and characteristics of the operator. Guide-
lines at regional level (or OECD) could be provided
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on how local authorities should judge the adequacy
of the type and amount of financial security offered
by operators.
 Government may, if this is judged necessary given
the potential scope of the damage and the lacking
capacity on commercial insurance markets, in a
later phase, decide to act as a reinsurer of last resort
to the extent that the market (either via insurance
or via alternative compensation mechanisms) can-
not generate a sufficient supply of financial secu-
rity for CCS-related risks.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This study started from the assumption that CCS is an interesting
and worthwhile technology. That assumption is based on the work of the
IPCC that, on the one hand, sees great benefits in CCS as a mitigating
strategy for climate change and also holds that the long-term risks with
CCS are relatively restricted.625 Not everyone may be convinced of the
blessings of CCS and some have even qualified it as false hope.626 The
goal of this study was of course not to take any position in this debate.
However, many mention that in order for CCS to succeed, there are today
still important barriers. Some of those barriers are of an economic nature
and those again were not the subject of this study.627 It is held that today
economic drivers for CCS are simply lacking in the absence of compre-
hensive climate policies that force stringent reductions of CO2 emissions.628
At the same time it is also held that one of the barriers for deploying CCS,
and hence moving CCS from hype to pipe,629 is the necessity to create
a clear legal institutional framework especially dealing with the long-
term liability. The fear for liability for long-tail risks could be an impor-
tant impediment to deploying CCS.630 This study attempted, using law
and economics literature and literature dealing with CCS-related risks,
625 See IPCC, supra note 23, at 14.
626 See GREENPEACE, supra note 30.
627 They have, to a large extent, to do with current carbon prices which provide insufficient
incentives to economic operators to invest in CCS. See COM (2013) 180 final, supra note
43, at 14.
628 See Hawkins, Peridas & Steelman, supra note 2, at 4405.
629 Id. at 4403.
630 Id. at 440507.
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to provide an indication how policymakers could provide certainty con-
cerning the potential liability risks by, on the one hand, limiting liability
in time and, on the other hand, providing adequate financial security. In
this way the potential positive externalities (in terms of reducing climate
change) could be appropriately balanced with the potential negative
externalities (related to the potential damage resulting from CCS).
Providing certainty on a legal regime dealing with liability and
compensation for potential risks is the aspect that was central to this
study. However, there are clearly many other aspects concerning the
underground injection of CO2, which need a regulatory framework or
where, put differently, the current regulatory framework, either at national
or at international level, may inhibit underground injection. These as-
pects, more particularly dealing with a facilitative regulatory framework
encouraging underground injection of CO2, are obviously of great impor-
tance as well even though they were not the subject of this Article.631
Of course, particular issues will still have to be worked out in
further detail. This concerns inter alia the question how long the various
phases (operation/injection, post-closure monitoring and long-term stew-
ardship) should take, since opinions in the literature on that point diverge.
Also the conditions under which after post-closure monitoring liability
could be transferred to government will have to be carefully determined
within the regulatory framework. As far as the question was concerned
whether there should be liability of operators also for long-tail risks
(during the indefinite phase of long-term stewardship) we started from
the premise that liability rules should have a deterrent effect and that
hence liability for long-term risks does not make any sense as far as pro-
viding incentives for deterrence is concerned. However, one should well
realize that others may argue that deterrence and economic efficiency are
not the only goals of a liability regime. Others could for example hold that,
even if it may not provide incentives for prevention, operators should still
be held liable for the long-tail risks, simply for distributional reasons (not
allowing operators to shift costs of their activities to society at large).
That was not the perspective taken in this study where, on the basis of
a weighing of positive and negative externalities created by CCS, it is
was argued that there are good reasons to limit the exposure of CCS
operators in time. That may, however, be an approach that is not shared
by all. In that case one could, for example, also imagine a financing of the
long-term stewardship via retrospective premiums (according to the model
631 See, e.g., Wilson, Johnson & Keith, supra note 59, at 347683.
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from the Price-Anderson Act) to be paid by CCS operators. The advan-
tage of such a model would be that in that case not tax payers but opera-
tors would still pay for the long-term stewardship. There would, however,
also be important disadvantages. One would be that operators would still
be confronted with long uncertainty perhaps even with an indefinite
character. Moreover, many operators maywhen damage would appear
after fifty yearsnot be identifiable any longer or have gone out of
business as a result of which the retrospective premiums could only be
recovered from operators still in business. This would create negative
redistribution and high administrative costs. On balance, it is therefore
held that a more radical solution, whereby liability is transferred to the
State for the long-term stewardship, would be preferable.
To some extent, many of the problems that were discussed in this
Article are not unique to CCS, but are typical for economic activities that
may cause long-term damage. Typical for those long-term risks is that
often both the occurrence of the damage as well as the amount of the
damage are highly uncertain. This is equally the case with potential
damage resulting from the storage of nuclear waste, but also with the
potential risks related to the use of shale gas or methane, even though
there are obviously differences as far as the nature of the risks is con-
cerned between those different activities. But to some extent, the solu-
tions and remedies proposed in this Article to CCS-related risks may have
implications as well for other potential risks related to energy exploita-
tion where there is equally still uncertainty concerning the probability
and nature of the potential risks. That should obviously be the subject of
further research.
